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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
“In the face of the crisis, we felt abandoned by conventional tools... we
need to develop complementary tools to improve robustness of our overall
framework... I would very much welcome inspiration from other disci-
plines: physics, engineering, biology. Bringing experts form these fields
together with economist and central bankers is potentially very creative
and valuable. Scientists have developed sophisticated tools for analyzing
complex dynamic systems in rigorous way.”
Jean-Claude Trichet,
European Central Bank Governor from 2003 to 2011,
in his speech at the ECBs flagship annual Central Banking Conference,
2010.
Neoclassical economics plays a fundamental role in the study of price
and income distributions in markets [8]. However, being focused on the
analysis of equilibrium configurations, it may fail into predicting sud-
den changes in the markets dynamics. Indeed, as pointed out by Lord
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Trichet, the recent economic crisis has highlighted the limitations of the
existing economic and financial models, which had been incapable of
predicting and explaining its driving factors [51]. These considerations
led to a tremendous interest in the scientific literature on the devel-
opment of tools and approaches that might complement neoclassical
economics, removing some of its main assumptions, such as rationality
and homogeneity of the financial agents [30]. In particular, one of the
crucial issues of traditional economics is the complete disregarding of
the interactions among the agents. Actually, recent develops in behav-
ioral economics had shown the natural tendency oh human beings of
imitate other people, learning from the behavior of others [100]. This
tendency is generally known as “herding behavior” and is a very com-
mon phenomenon characterizing human life. Since in early childhood,
for instance, babies try to imitate the adults around them. They mimic
the actions and the facial expressions of adults. This is how they learn
about what certain actions signify. In financial markets, this predispo-
sition to imitate is deeply rooted. Investors may abandon what they
believe to be their own available information on the market and follow
the behavior of other investors instead, although their own information
indicates that they should have an entirely different behavior. If all the
traders behave in the same way, the possible result might be that all,
or most of them, take the same investment decision, triggering what
is called “informational cascade”. This could lead to substantial price
fluctuations in the market, and eventually to a financial crisis. Informa-
tional cascades are the evidence that individual rationality may lead to
group irrationality.
Herding in financial markets, therefore, may arise when payoffs are sim-
ilar even if personal information on the market is not. In this case
people communicate with each other or observe the actions of others,
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or the consequences of these actions. The key issue is how individu-
als determine which alternative is better. Each individual could decide
by direct analysis of the alternatives. However, this can be costly and
time-consuming, so a plausible alternative is to rely on the information
of others. Such influence may take the form of direct communication
and discussion with, or simply observation of others. In any case, it
requires a kind of interaction. Thus, interactions among the agents, dis-
regarded by neoclassical economy, are crucial to understand the market
dynamics.
In order to overcome the limitations of traditional models, a special in-
terest emerged for a complex system approach, which involves the use
of agent-based models [84, 25, 30, 50, 5, 26, 74, 75, 83]. In particular,
the European Union is supporting the research in this area under the
7th framework program, see for instance the project CRISIS [1]. Agent-
based models take advantage of the increased computational capabilities
to model financial markets at a microscopical level: they allow to sim-
ulate the behavior of a (possibly high) number of decision-makers and
institutions, interacting through prescribed rules; the agents may be het-
erogeneous and have the capability of adapting their actions according
to their current situation, the inputs from the environment [80], and the
rules governing their behaviour [9].
Complex networks paradigm represents a fundamental tool in this per-
spective: exploiting the link between multi-agent systems and graph
theory [13], each agent can be seen as a node of a dynamical network,
and the topology of interconnections well model the reciprocal influence
among the agents. This allows to take into account lots of scenarios
of interactions and different kinds of agents’ behavior, differently from
neoclassical models, and eventually to investigate the macro features of
the market emerging from the local interactions among the agents.
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In this perspective, the purpose of this thesis is to make a further step
toward the understanding and the modeling of financial dynamics. We
are confident that our scientific community could give its contribution
in this direction. In particular, we will focus on the phenomenon of
informational cascades occurring in financial markets. Our aim is to
provide new tools from nonlinear dynamical systems and control theory,
which, matched with complex networks and agent-based modeling, allow
to model, analyze and eventually predict such phenomena.
Mixing tools from agent-based modeling and complex networks, we first
propose a reference scenario of artificial financial market, in which each
agent is modeled as a nonlinear dynamical system. Different environ-
mental features and agents’ behaviors are implemented, with a partic-
ular focus on the agents’ interactions, in order to observe the possible
tendency of the agents of converging towards a general consensus.
The next step is that of analyzing the effects of herd behavior in such
scenarios. In the existing models of informational cascades, the presence
of an exogenous information available to all or a subset of agents is
assumed. In line with this choice, we test the response of our market to
exogenous factors, such as a new available information.
Our aim is to treat herding from a new perspective, that is, with a
control theory approach. We start by noting that herding is actually
a diffusive process, as it generates the spreading of a certain opinion
across the financial traders which leads them toward the same trading
action. Consequently, we propose a new model of opinion dynamics in
which the agents influence each other through a diffusive coupling, in
order to capture the tendency of the agents of following the trading
actions of some other agents they consider better informed. In this
model, the exogenous information becomes an external signal exerted
on a subset of traders. In the view of this, we can treat herding as a
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pinning control problem, so to leverage the contributions in the field
of pinning control to predict the emergence of informational cascades.
Moreover, differently from the models already present in the literature
which only generate total informational cascades [7, 11, 15, 137], we
exploit the recent contributions in the field of partial pinning control [37]
to take into account the more realistic case of partial cascades, which
do not involve all the financial traders, as shown by empirical evidence
[70, 127]. We show our ability of modeling and predicting the intensity
of such phenomena in artificial markets exploiting tools from control
theory and nonlinear dynamical systems, providing a little contribution
in the hard task of understanding and explaining financial dynamics.
Eventually, we propose an alternative method, based on the generating
functions approach [96, 95], to analytically predict information about
partial pinning controllability of a given network.
1.2 Thesis Outline
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we will introduce the
problem of synchronization of complex networks, with a particular focus
on pinning control methods. In Chapter 3, we will build an agent-based
model of artificial financial market. In Chapter 4, we define the concepts
of herding behavior and informational cascades, focusing on the classical
models of informational cascades already present in the literature. In
Chapter 5, we will first review the existing models of opinion dynamics.
Then, we will introduce a novel opinion dynamics model which accounts
for the phenomenon of partial informational cascades. The actual ca-
pability of the proposed model of triggering informational cascades of
different intensities will be extensively exposed in Chapter 6. Here, we
will explain how informational cascades can be seen as a pinning control
problem. This will allow to leverage tools prof pinning control theory to
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predict such phenomena. We will test our model in the artificial financial
market proposed in Chapter 3, showing by numerical simulations that
the intensities of the triggered informational cascades confirm our pre-
dictions made through the tools of pinning control theory. Eventually,
in Chapter 7, we will explain how the concept of phase transitions may
be related to the analysis of partial pinning controllability of complex
networks. Moreover, we will propose an analytic method, based on the
generating functions, to predict the partial pinning controllability of a
generic network, and will highlight how this approach allows to answer
some related questions of the topic, while other questions are still open,
and could be object of future research.
We highlight that the content of Chapter 3 has been proposed in [38],
while the results of Chapters 5 and 6 are included in [57].
CHAPTER 2
Selected Topics on Pinning
Control of Complex
Networks
Complex networks are currently being studied across many fields of sci-
ence, as many systems in nature can be described by models of complex
networks. Examples are numerous. The World Wide Web is a network
of websites. The brain is a network of neurons. An organization is a net-
work of people. The global economy is a network of national economies,
which are themselves networks of markets, and markets are themselves
networks of interacting producers and consumers.
The complex networks paradigm allows to model such real world com-
plex systems as ensembles of dynamical systems, the nodes, interacting
with each other according to an underlying topology [116, 124].
One of the main features of complex network paradigm is that it does
not necessarily requires a purely mathematical study of the dynamical
system which describes the nodes’ dynamics in order to understand the
network behavior. Namely, under appropriate assumptions on the nodes’
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intrinsic dynamics and on the coupling mechanism, it allows to analyze
the nodes’ behavior just taking into account the network topology. In
the view of this, in the following we summarize some graph theoretical
tools necessary to cope with networked systems.
2.1 Elements of Graph Theory
A network of agents is commonly represented by a graph.
Definition 2.1.1. A weighted graph G is a triplet {V, E , A}, where
V = {1, ..., N} is the set of nodes, or vertices, E ⊆ V × V is the set of
edges connecting the nodes, and A = {aij}i,j∈V ∈ RN×N is the weighted
adjacency matrix, whose generic element is defined as
aij
{
> 0, if (i, j) ∈ E
= 0, otherwise.
(2-1)
Definition 2.1.2. A graph is undirected if A is symmetric and its di-
agonal elements are equal to 0.
Definition 2.1.3. A graph is directed if A is not symmetric. A directed
graph is also called digraph.
In this thesis, we will mainly focus on digraphs and weighted digraphs,
which include the particular cases of undirected and non weighted
graphs. An undirected and non weighted graph, indeed, can be regarded
as a weighted digraph with all weights equal to 1, and A = A>. In other
words, the associated adjacency matrix is a binary and symmetric ma-
trix. Notice that an unweighted graph is generally defined as the pair
{V, E}.
Definition 2.1.4. The set of in- and out- neighbors of a node i are
defined as Nin(i) = {j ∈ V : (j, i) ∈ E}, and Nout(i) = {j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈
E}, respectively.
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Definition 2.1.5. the weighted in- and out- degree of a node i are de-
fined as
din(i) =
N∑
j=1
aji, dout(i) =
N∑
j=1
aij , (2-2)
respectively.
Definition 2.1.6. The weighted in- and out- degree matrices are defined
as
Din = diag(A
>
1N ) =
din(1) 0 00 . . . 0
0 0 din(N)
 ;
Dout = diag(A1N ) =
dout(1) 0 00 . . . 0
0 0 dout(N)
 .
Definition 2.1.7. A self-loop is an edge from a node to itself. Consis-
tently with a customary convention, self-loops are not allowed in graphs.
Definition 2.1.8. A source is a vertex with 0 in-degree; while a sink is
a vertex with 0 out-degree.
2.1.1 Paths and Connectivity in Digraphs
Definition 2.1.9. A directed path is an ordered sequence of vertices
such that any pair of consecutive vertices in the sequence is a directed
edge of the digraph. A directed path is simple if no vertex appears more
than once in it, except possibly for the initial and final vertex.
Definition 2.1.10. A digraph is connected if there exists a path between
any two vertices. If a digraph is not connected, it is composed by multiple
connected components.
Definition 2.1.11. A digraph H = {V ′, E ′} is a subgraph of G = {V, E}
if V ′ ⊆ V, and E ′ ⊆ E. H is a spanning subgraph if it is a subgraph and
V ′ = V.
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Definition 2.1.12. A cycle is a simple directed path which starts and
ends in the same vertex. It is customary to accept as feasible cycles in
digraphs also self-loops, and cycles of length 2.
Definition 2.1.13. A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is a graph which
does not encompass cycles.
Every DAG has at least one source and one sink.
Definition 2.1.14. A directed tree is a DAG with the following property:
there exist a vertex, called the root, such that any other vertex can be
reached by one and only one directed path starting by the root.
2.1.2 Connectivity Properties in Digraphs
Here, we summarize some basic properties of digraphs.
Property 2.1.1. A digraph G
(i) is strongly connected if there exists a directed path from any node
to any other node;
(ii) is weakly connected if the undirected version of the graph is con-
nected;
(iii) possesses a globally reachable node if one of its nodes can be reached
from any other node through a directed path;
(iv) possesses a directed spanning tree if one of its node is the root of
directed paths to every other node.
2.1.3 Condensation Digraphs
Definition 2.1.15. A subgraph H is a strongly connected component
(SCC) of G if H is strongly connected and any other subgraph of G
strictly containing H is not strongly connected.
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Definition 2.1.16. A root strongly connected component (RSCC) of a
graph G is a SCC of G such that there are no edges entering a node of
the SCC that exit from a node that is not encompassed in the SCC.
Definition 2.1.17. The DAG condensation of a digraph G, denoted as
GD, is defined as follows: the nodes of GD are the strongly connected
components of G, and there exists a directed edge in GD from node H1
to node H2 if and only if there exists a directed edge in G from a node
of H1 to a node of H2.
An example of condensation digraph is reported in Fig. 2-1.
Figure 2-1: A digraph, its strongly connected components and
its condensation [20].
Lemma 2.1.1. For a digraph G and its condensation digraph GD,
(i) GD is acyclic;
(ii) G is weakly connected if and only if GD is weakly connected, and
(iii) the following statements are equivalent:
a) G contains a globally reachable node,
b) GD contains a globally reachable node, and
c) GD contains a unique sink.
Proof. See [20], Sec. 3.3.
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2.1.3.1 Structure of a Digraph
The structure of a digraph is best summarized in the bow-tie diagram
introduced in [19, 42] (see Fig. 2.1.3.1). Namely, a general digraph is
composed by:
Figure 2-2: The bow-tie diagram od a digraph.
 a Giant Strongly Connected Component (GSCC), in which there
exists a direct path between any two nodes;
 a Giant In-Component (GIN), composed by all the nodes that can
reach the GSCC by a direct path, but not vice versa;
 a Giant Out-Component (GOUT), each node of which is accessible
starting from the GSCC;
 tendrils, that is, vertices which do not have direct access to the
GSCC and are not reachable from it (among them, there are the
tubes, going from the GIN to GOUT without passing through the
GSCC);
 some Disconnected Domponents (DC).
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Notice that the undirected version of th bow-tie diagram consists of a
Giant Weakly Connected Component (GWCC), in which there exists a
path between any two nodes, and disconnected components.
2.1.4 Algebraic Graph Theory
Here, we summarize some basic results which involve the correspondence
between digraphs and adjacency matrices.
Property 2.1.2. (Properties of weighted digraphs.)
(i) A weighted digraph G is weight-balanced if and only if A1N =
A>1N , i.e., Din = Dout. This means that each vertex has the
same weighted in- and out-degree, even if distinct vertices have
distinct weighted degrees.
(ii) In a digraph without self-loops, node i is a source if and only if∑N
j=1 aji = 0.
(iii) In a digraph without self-loops, node i is a sink if and only if∑N
j=1 aij = 0.
(iv) A is row-stochastic if and only if each node of G has weighted out-
degree equal to 1, that is, Dout = IN .
(v) A is doubly-stochastic if and only if each node of G has weighted
in- and out- degree equal to 1, that is, Din = Dout = IN . In this
case, G is weight-balanced.
2.1.4.1 Elements of Spectral Graph Theory
In this section, we provide some results on the spectral radius of a non-
negative matrix A.
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Theorem 2.1.1. (Bounds on the spectral radius of a non-negative ma-
trix.) For a non-negative matrix A with associated digraph G, the fol-
lowing statements hold:
(i) ρ(A) ≤ max(A1N ), where ρ(A) is the spectral radius of A;
(ii) if min(A1N ) = max(A1N ), then ρ(A) = max(A1N );
(iii) if min(A1N ) < max(A1N ), the following statements are equiva-
lent:
a) for each node i with e>i A = max(A1N ), there exists a di-
rected path in G from node i to a node j with e>j A < max(A1N ),
b) ρ(A) < max(A1N ).
Proof. See [20].
2.1.4.2 The Laplacian Matrix
Definition 2.1.18. The Laplacian matrix of a weighted digraph G is
L = {lij}i,j∈V = Dout −A, (2-3)
where the generic element is
lij =
{
−aij , if i 6= j,∑N
j=1,j 6=i aij if i = j.
(2-4)
In what follows, we remark some properties of the Laplacian matrix and
its associated digraph.
Property 2.1.3. (Properties of the Laplacian matrix.)
(i) L does not depend on the existence and weight of self-loops in G;
(ii) G is undirected if and only if L is symmetric;
(iii) lii = 0 if and only if node i has zero out-degree;
(iv) L is irreducible [14] if G is strongly connected.
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2.2 Synchronization of Discrete-Time Net-
worked Systems
One of the most interesting and significant phenomena in complex
dynamical networks is the synchronization of all dynamical nodes
[123, 122, 6]. Namely, it has been demonstrated that many real-world
problems have close relationships with network synchronization, such as
the lighting of fireflies, and the spread of an epidemic or computer virus.
Over the past years, the synchronization of networks had been deeply
researched by many scientists from various fields, for instance, sociology,
biology, mathematics and physics.
In the following, we review the main results for synchronization of
discrete-time systems. Notice that, typically, consensus involves net-
work of linear systems, while synchronization refers to networked non-
linear systems.
2.2.1 Consensus of Linear Dynamical Systems
In networks of agents, consensus means to reach an agreement regarding
a certain quantity of interest that depends on the state of all agents. A
consensus algorithm (or protocol) is an interaction rule that specifies the
information exchange between an agent and all of its neighbors on the
network.
Let us consider a network of decision-making agents with linear dynam-
ics
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) + ui(k), (2-5)
where  > 0, and ui(k) is the consensus protocol to be defined.
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Definition 2.2.1. We say that a consensus protocol guarantees asymp-
totic consensus of system (2-9) if the following holds: for every x(0),
there exists some c such that limk→∞ xi(k) = c, ∀i.
Definition 2.2.2. We say that a consensus protocol guarantees asymp-
totic average-consensus of system (2-9) if the following holds: for every
x(0), there exists c =
(∑
i xi(0)
)
/N such that limk→∞ xi(k) = c, ∀i.
For a fixed weighted topology G, the following consensus protocol is used
[98]:
ui(k) =
∑
j∈Ni
aij(xj(k)− xi(k)), (2-6)
which means that each node updates its current state xi(k) to some
weighted linear combination of its neighbors values. In the view of this,
the dynamics of agent i becomes
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) + 
∑
j∈Ni
aij
(
xj(k)− xi(k)
)
, (2-7)
while the collective dynamics of the network under this algorithm can
be written as
x(k + 1) = Px(k), (2-8)
where P = IN − L is the Perron matrix of the graph G with parameter
.
Theorem 2.2.1. Consider the networked system in (2-7), where 0 <
 < 1/∆, and ∆ is the maximum degree of the network G, which is
supposed to be strongly connected. Then
(i) a consensus is asymptotically reached for all initial states;
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(ii) the group decision value is α =
∑
i αixi(0), with
∑
i αi = 1;
(iii) if G is weight-balanced (or P is doubly-stochastic), an average con-
sensus is asymptotically reached, and α =
(∑
i xi(0)
)
/N .
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 2 in [97].
Thus, consensus protocol (2-6) guarantees convergence to a collective
decision via local interactions for a system of linear dynamical systems
coupled through a fixed topology.
2.2.2 Synchronization of Nonlinear Dynamical Systems
Let us consider the general nonlinear system
xi(k + 1) = fi
(
xi(k)
)
+ σ
∑
j
aij(k)hij
(
xi(k), xj(k)
)
, (2-9)
where xi(k) is the state of the i-th node of the network, fi
(
xi(k)
)
is
the vector field describing its intrinsic dynamics, hij
(
xi(k), xj(k)
)
is the
function that defines the interaction between nodes i and j, the coeffi-
cient aij(k) indicates whether the current dynamics of node i depends on
that of node j, and σ > 0 is the coupling strength. We emphasize that,
in this thesis, we will mainly focus on discrete-time dynamical systems
with diffusive coupling.
Definition 2.2.3. System (2-9) is said to be asymptotically synchro-
nized if limk→∞ ||xi(k) − xj(k)|| = 0, or, equivalently, x1(k) = x2(k) =
... = xN (k) as k →∞.
In the field of nonlinear dynamical systems, different approaches have
been proposed to study the synchronization of systems as in (2-9), that
is, Lyapunov−Krasovskii direct method, the Master Stability Function
approach [104], contraction theory [110].
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Although analytic conditions for making all nodes converge towards a
synchronous asymptotic solution have been obtained, a major problem
still remains from a control viewpoint. Indeed, such common solution,
if it exists, cannot be determined a priori to be some desired trajectory.
A possible strategy to achieve this goal would be to directly add some
feedback control input on each of the systems in the network so to steer
the dynamics of each individual agent towards the desired trajectory.
In practice, when more than a handful of agents are considered, this
approach is not viable. A feasible alternative is represented by the so-
called Pinning Control Strategy [123, 78], where the control action is
exerted through an additional node which is connected to a subset of
the network nodes, the pinned nodes, and thus triggers the propagation
of the control signals to the uncontrolled nodes through the network
edges.
In the rapidly growing literature on pinning control, considerable re-
search efforts have been focused on the analysis of coupled continuous
dynamical systems [106, 52, 138, 36, 35, 32, 135]. However, pinning
controllability of discrete dynamical systems is a relatively untapped re-
search area with our ability to effectively control the evolution of such
systems being currently limited to few scenarios, which will be discussed
in the next section.
2.3 Pinning Control
Pinning control is a control strategy which allows to achieve synchro-
nization of a network of dynamical systems towards a desired trajectory.
This strategy assumes the existence of an external node, the pinner,
which generates a reference trajectory used to exert a control action only
to a small fraction of the networked nodes, also called pinned nodes. In
this scenario, the problem consists not only in designing the strength
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and form of the control action to be exerted by the pinner, but also
in determining how many, and what type of pinned nodes need to be
selected to achieve the control objective [113].
Let us consider the nonlinear system
xi(k + 1) = f
(
xi(k)
)
+ σ
N∑
j=1
lij(k)h
(
xj(k)
)
, (2-10)
where f and h are nonlinear functions, lij(k) is the generic element of the
time-varying laplacian matrix, and the pinner’s trajectory x¯ satisfying
x¯ = f(x¯). (2-11)
Definition 2.3.1. Network (2-10) is said to be fully pinning controlled
to the pinner’s trajectory (2-11) when limk→∞ ||xi(k)− x¯|| = 0 ∀i.
To achieve synchronization, feedback pinning controllers are applied to
a subset P of the network nodes, where |P| = p. In the view of this, the
controlled network can be described as
xi(k + 1) = f
(
xi(k)
)
+ σ
N∑
j=1
lij(k)h
(
xj(k)
)
+ ui(k), (2-12)
with the local feedback controllers given by
ui(k) = −κδi
(
h(xi(k))− h(x¯)
)
, (2-13)
where κ is the control gain, and
δi =
{
δ, ∀i ∈ P,
0, otherwise.
(2-14)
Then, network (2-10) becomes
xi(k+1) = f
(
xi(k)
)
+σ
N∑
j=1
lij(k)h
(
xj(k)
)−κδi(h(xi(k))−h(x¯)). (2-15)
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Unfortunately, while the literature on pinning control of continuous-time
systems is extremely vast, see e.g. [65, 79, 114, 134] and the references
therein, only few contributions are available in the literature which study
the pinning controllability of system (2-15). Among these, in [132], the
authors generalize the classical master stability function introduced in
[103] to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for local pinning
controllability of discrete-time systems. The results are extended to the
case of uniform constant communication delays in [82]. In the recent
work [131], instead, sufficient conditions based on Lyapunov function
for achieving synchronization of discrete-time networks via impulsive
pinning control are provided, while [94] investigates the controllability
of discrete-time networks of coupled chaotic maps through stochastic
pinning. Eventually, [136] shows through extensive simulations that pin-
ning control of discrete-time dynamical networks is a challenging task,
whereby direct control of a large fraction of the network nodes is gener-
ally required. Notice that all the aforementioned studies account for the
hypothesis of static topologies. To the best of our knowledge, no contri-
butions have been made in the field of pinning control of discrete-time
systems with time-varying networks of interaction.
2.4 Partial Pinning Control
Often, in applications, achieving complete controllability is a chimera as
both economical and physical constraints typically affect the selection
of the pinned nodes. For instance, previous works [81, 93] has pointed
out that for gene regulatory networks, a considerable amount of pinned
nodes are needed to achieve complete controllability, which can turn
out unfeasible. Moreover, it is often the case that the selection of the
pinned nodes is restricted to a well-defined subset of the nodes of the
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network. For instance, in designing curative interventions, only some
easily accessible proteins are designated as targets for drugs [71].
In this perspective, the problem becomes that of selecting the nodes to
be pinned so as to drag the greatest number of nodes under control of
the pinner under physical or economic constraints. This is what we call
the partial pinning control problem.
Definition 2.4.1. Network (2-10) is said to be q-partially pinning con-
trolled to the pinner’s trajectory (2-11) when limk→∞ ||xi(k) − x¯|| =
0 ∀i ∈ Q, where Q ⊆ V, and q = |Q|.
In [37], the partial pinning control problem is defined as
q∗ = maxP |Q|
|P| = p. (2-16)
The problem is solved for a class of continuous nonlinear systems, and
for any limited numbers of pinned nodes. Namely, under appropriate as-
sumptions on the nodes’ dynamics, structural conditions which ensure
the partial pinning controllability of the system are provided. The prob-
lem is translated into an integer linear program (ILP), and an optimiza-
tion problem is formulated and solved for the selection of the pinning
and coupling gains.
Unfortunately, no analytic results in the literature accounts for the prob-
lem of partial pinning controllability of discrete dynamical systems.
That’s why, in this thesis, we approach to partial pinning control fo-
cusing on the structural conditions available in [37], assuming that the
conditions on the nodes’ dynamics are satisfied.
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2.4.1 Structural Conditions for Partial Pinning Control-
lability
In order to find the topological conditions to maximize the number of
nodes which synchronize to the pinner’s trajectory, the pinned node se-
lection algorithm is proposed in [37]. It translates problem (2-16) of
maximizing the number of pinning controlled nodes q into an optimiza-
tion problem on a graph. To do so, it relies on the following structural
condition: a node is pinning controllable if all of the RSCC in its up-
stream encompass at least a pinned node. This condition is based on
the following property of the RSCC:
Property 2.4.1. A RSCC is pinning controllable if at least one node
benolging to the RSCC is pinning controllable.
Hence, the algorithm selects the set of p RSCCs to be pinned that max-
imize the number of nodes fulfilling such structural condition.
In what follows, we remark the main steps of the partial pinning control
algorithm.
Let us denote:
 GD the DAG condensation of a generic digraph G;
 C the set of pinnable nodes, with P ⊆ C;
 γi the generic SCC of GD;
 ri the generic RSCC of GD;
 Γ(ri) the set of nodes in the downstream of ri;
 Φ the set of pinned RSCCs.
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In the view of this, problem (2-16) becomes
Φ∗ = max
|Φ|=p
|Γ(Φ)|. (2-17)
Case p = 1
By pinning an arbitrary node of ri, all the nodes in Γ(ri) are pinning
controlled. Hence, if p = 1, the solution of problem (2-17) consists in
selecting as the only pinned node an arbitrary node of RSCC ri∗ , with
i∗ = arg maxi |Γ(ri)|.
Case p > 1
The procedure is the following:
1) build a new graph G′ through the following steps:
(a) define RC as the set of roots of GD that include at least a
node belonging to C;
(b) add to G′ all the roots in RC ;
(c) add to G′ all the non-roots γi of GD that are in the down-
stream of no more than p roots of GD (all encompassed in RC);
(d) for all pairs γi, rj ∈ G′, add an edge yij connecting γi to rj
if, in GD, γi is in the downstream of rj ;
(e) add an additional node pi, representing the pinner, and
connect it to all the roots rj ∈ G′ through a set of edges yjpi;
2) associate to all edges of the graph G′ the following weights:
(a) wij = |γi| ∀i, i.e., all edges entering the i-th node γi have
a weight equal to the number of nodes in the SCC γi;
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(b) wjpi = |rj | ∀j, i.e., all edges entering the j-th root rj have
a weight equal to the number of nodes in the RSCC rj ;
3) solve the following ILP:
max
y
∑
i
∑
j
wijyij +
∑
j
wijyij (2-18)
s.t. ∑
j
yjpi = p (2-19)
∑
j
yij ≤ 1
degin(i)
∑
j|∃yij
yjpi ∀i (2-20)
yij , yjpi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j (2-21)
This procedure first creates a new graph G′, whose nodes are RSCCs
encompassing at least a node of C or SCCs in the downstream of such
RSCCs. Each node representing a RSCC is connected to the SCCs
in its downstream. Notice that the procedure does not include any
node representing an SCC having either (i) more than p RSCCs in its
upstream or (ii) an RSCC in its upstream that does not encompass any
node of C, as it cannot guarantee that these SCCs are pinning controlled
with a selection of p pinned nodes. Then, the pinner pi is added to G′
and is connected to all nodes ri representing the RSCCs. Finally, it
associates to each edge in G′ a weight equal to the number of nodes in
the (R)SCC it points to. The solution of the ILP in (2-18)-(2-21) is
then equivalent to determine the RSCCs in which a pinned node must
fall and the corresponding SCCs that can be pinning controlled. Namely,
SCC γi can be pinning controlled if there exists a j such that yij = 1,
and RSCC rj will include a pinned node if yij = 1. Accordingly, the
objective function to be maximized in (2-18) represents the total number
of pinning controlled nodes. The constraint (2-19) guarantees that the
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pinned nodes are p, while Eq. (2-20) imposes that the nodes of an SCC
are pinning controlled only if a node is pinned in each of the RSCCs in
their upstream.
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CHAPTER 3
The Artificial Financial
Market
In this chapter, we build an artificial financial market, which will be
used for testing different models of agents’ behavior in order to analyze
and predict the possible emergence of informational cascades.
Our interest focus on agent-based modeling (ABM), as it succeeds in
complementing neoclassical economics models, removing some of their
main assumptions, such as homogeneity of the financial agents [2, 30]. As
evidence of their effectiveness, in the last decades several contributions
in the field of financial ABM have been proposed, see for instance [4, 21,
102, 26, 50, 59, 74, 75, 87, 120, 128, 111, 129, 40, 24, 99, 61, 23].
Agent-based approaches have also been used to test the effects of poli-
cies, regulations and taxation systems on the market dynamics, see for
instance [129, 40]. Inspired by the seminal work of Tobin [119], for in-
stance, several taxes on financial transactions were proposed to regulate
the markets, whose effects have been controversial [62, 77].
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing models of artificial
markets accounts for herding phenomena and different taxation schemes
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at the same time. In the view of this, we build a novel artificial financial
market that is capable of testing the delicate interplay between agents’
interactions, the inequality in wealth distribution, and the balancing of
two common alternative taxation schemes.
The concepts of learning and adaptation are generally applied to utility
functions, that may not be fixed, as observed in [29, 31, 33]. In the view
of this, in our market the agents behave according to utility theory,
and, at a first instance, are grouped in three classes with different risk
attitudes and subsequent trading strategies.
We consider two kinds of agents’ intraction. In the first case, the agents
do not interact with each other. They are stubborn agents [105], who
keep their own risk attitude regardless of the effectiveness of the conse-
quent trading strategy. In the second case, we consider an interaction
dynamics which accounts for the presence of leaders.
In order to test the likelihood of our artificial market with empirical
evidence, we study the emerging features of the market in terms of
trading volumes and wealth distribution, characterized through the Gini
coefficient [60], in presence of a Tobin-like tax and a flat tax, respectively.
Even though the validation of agent-based models is a hard task [74],
we show that our results are qualitative consistent with some empirical
evidences. Thus, this scenario is useful to test the emergence of herding
behavior, which we will manage from a new perspective, that of control
theory. The details of our choice will be extensively discussed in the
following chapters.
3.1 Market Structure
We introduce an agent-based financial market populated by a set of N
agents, who can choose among alternative financial assets. The state of
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each agent i is defined as his current wealth ri and risk attitude yi. The
agents behave according to the Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility
theory [121], and alternative taxation schemes and interaction rules are
considered.
3.1.1 Financial Assets
At each time step k = 1, 2, ..., a simulated trading session is performed.
Each agent, in a sequential random order, evaluates the convenience of
investing a given fraction  of his current wealth ri(k) in one of the fi-
nancial assets from the set L = {1, . . . , L}. The return of the j-th asset
is modeled as a stochastic process βj with equiprobable realizations a¯j
and b¯j . In other words, a¯j and b¯j are the win and loss rates associated
to the j-th asset1. The assets in L are characterized by a limited avail-
ability Aj , j = 1, ..., L, where AL = +∞ is associated to a virtual asset,
corresponding to no-investment. In view of this, each agent is allowed
to invest in one of the available assets, that is, in any element of L such
that Aj ≥ ri(k). Agents’ access to trading is randomly permuted at
each time step k, so that, on average, no agent is favored. After each
trading, the availability of the selected asset is updated before the next
agent is allowed to trade.
3.1.2 Trading Strategy
According to the Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility theory [121], a
rational agent who acts in an uncertain environment takes his choices
maximizing the expected value of some function defined as utility func-
tion. In the view of this, we associates to each agent the following
1Notice that x¯j = E[βj ] = 0.5
(
a¯j + b¯j
)
is the expected return of asset j, which is
assumed to be constant for the sake of simplicity.
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power-law utility function:
E
[
Ui(k)
]
= 0.5
[(
ai(k)ri(k)
)yi(k) + (bi(k)ri(k))yi(k)], (3-1)
where E
[
Ui(k)
]
=
[
E
[
U1i (k)
]
, ..., E
[
ULi (k)
]]
is a vector which includes
the current expected utilities that agent i associates to each asset j =
1, ..., L, yi(k) is the state variable which determines the risk attitude of
the i -th agent, ai(k) =
[
a1i (k), ..., a
L
i (k)
]
and bi(k) =
[
b1i (k), ..., b
L
i (k)
]
are the current win and loss rates associated by agent i to all the assets.
Equation (3-1) is a flexible function that allows us to model heteroge-
neous agents which differ each other in some crucial features, such as
risk attitude and information on the assets.
For the sake of simplicity, at a first instance we assume that all the
agents share the correct information on the assets. This means that all
the agents know the correct probability distribution of the assets’ return.
Thus, we select ai(k) = a¯ =
[
a¯1, ..., a¯L
]
, and bi(k) = b¯ =
[
b¯1, ..., b¯L
] ∀i, k
(in Chapter 6, this constraint will be relaxed).
In the view of this, Eq. (3-1) becomes
E
[
Ui(k)
]
= 0.5
[(
a¯ri(k)
)yi(k) + (b¯ri(k))yi(k)]. (3-2)
At each time instant k, agent i evaluates the possibility of investing the
fraction  of his current wealth based on his expected utilities of the
assets. Hence, the trading decision
si(k) = g
(
E
[
Ui(k)
])
, (3-3)
is a function g which returns a vector si(k) = [s
1
i (k), ..., s
L
i (k)] defining
the ranking of the assets corresponding to agent’s i preferences:
sji (k) := m : ∃m−1 E
[
U li (k)
]
> E
[
U ji (k)
]
, ∃ L−mE[U li (k)] < E[U ji (k)].
(3-4)
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The j-th element sji (k) of si(k) is the integer m defining the position
of asset j in the ranking of the assets made by agent i. Due to the
limited availability of the assets, the actual trading action made by agent
i corresponds to trade in the first available asset l∗ according to his
preferences si(k).
The outcome of the trade made by agent i is a realization of βl
∗
. There-
fore, the dynamic equation describing the evolution of the wealth r−i (k)
of agent i before the taxation is given by:
r−i (k) = ri(k−1)+γri(k−1)(a¯l
∗−1)−(1−γ)rj(k−1)(1− b¯l∗), (3-5)
where γ is a binary variable (γ = 1 if the trading made by agent i is
successful, and 0 otherwise). When the trading session is over, a tax is
applied and the wealth of agent i at time k is updated as
ri(k) = τ
(
r−i (k)
)
, (3-6)
where τ is a nonlinear function describing the selected taxation scheme.
In what follows, we characterize this function for two different taxation
schemes.
3.1.3 Taxation Schemes
We consider two alternative taxation systems, which affect the current
wealth of the agents r−i (k), i = 1, ..., N in different ways: a) taxation
on financial transactions, and b) taxation on wealth.
3.1.3.1 Tobin-like Tax
Taxes on financial transactions have been adopted in several countries
in the last century: a well-known example is the so-called Tobin Tax
[119], named after the Nobel prize James Tobin, whose original scope
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was to put a penalty on short-term financial round-trip excursions into
another currency.
The financial transaction tax a) is actually a Tobin-like tax (TT), which
reduces the current wealth of the winning agents by a profit fraction
u(k) given by
u(k) =
{
p(k)∑N
i=1 hi(k)
, p(k) > 0,
0, p(k) ≤ 0,
(3-7)
where hi(k) = r
−
i (k) − ri(k − 1), and p(k) =
∑N
i=1
(
r−i (k) − ri(0)
)
.
Accordingly, (3-6) becomes
ri(k) = r
−
i (k)−H
(
hi(k)
)
hi(k)u(k), (3-8)
where H is the Heaviside step function.
3.1.3.2 Flat Tax
The alternative taxation scheme b) is a flat tax (FT), in which the
amount of the tax is proportional to the total wealth of the individual.
Accordingly, (3-6) becomes
ri(k) = v(k)r
−
i (k), (3-9)
where v(k) =
∑N
j=1 ri(0)∑N
i=1 r
−
i (k)
.
Notice that, to allow for a proper comparison between the two taxation
schemes, the coefficients u(k) and v(k) in (3-7) and (3-9), respectively,
are selected so as to keep the average wealth constant over time, that is,
1
N
∑N
i=1 ri(k) = r¯.
3.2 Agents’ Behavior
We populate the artificial market with heterogeneous agents. Based
on their current risk attitude, we group the agents in three classes. In
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the first one, there are the agents characterized by a low risk attitude,
denoted in what follows as prudent agents. The agents that are more
prone to take risks are denoted audacious and grouped in the third
class. Finally, the intermediate class groups the ordinary agents. We
emphasize here that an agent may decide not to invest (formally, to
invest in the L-th asset), if E
[
ULi (k)
] ≥ E[U ji (k)] for all j = 1, . . . , L−1.
We test our scenario by considering two different kinds of agents’ be-
havior:
Case I
the agents do not interact with each other. Thus, the market is composed
of stubborn agents, who do not modify their utility function even if
they observe that their investing strategy is not successful. Accordingly,
their risk attitude is considered as a parameter rather than an evolving
state, and coincides with the initial risk attitude yi(0) for all k ∈ N,
i = 1, . . . , N .
Case II
The agents are adaptive, as they are prone to directly interact with each
other and update their trading strategy. In particular, we model the
strategy modification as a variation of the risk attitude yi(k) in (3-2).
The reciprocal influence among the agents diffuses through a connection
topology described by a directed graph G = {V, E}, where V is the set
of nodes, corresponding to the agents, and E is the set of directed edges
connecting the nodes (see Sec. 2.1). The existence of an edge (i, j)
implies that the risk attitude of node j is influenced by that of node i.
The dynamics of yi(k) in (3-2) is described by
yi(k) = (1− λ)yi(0) + λ|Ni|
∑
h∈Ni
yh(k − 1), (3-10)
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where λ is the interaction weight, yi(0) is the inner risk attitude, and Ni
is the set of in-neighbors of agent i (see Def. 2.1.4)2. We remark that
the bigger the coefficient λ is, the more the agents are prone to modify
their utility function: λ = 0 models the case of stubborn agents, while
λ = 1 the case in which the agents completely disregard their innate risk
attitudes and emulate the neighbor behaviors.
3.2.1 Leaders and Communities
The interaction topology is modelled as a disjoint directed scale-free
network, and the graph G is decomposed in up to three disconnected
components, the communities, each of which is guided by leaders be-
longing to the same risk attitude class. Namely, inside each community,
we consider emulating the rich dynamics, where the richest agents are
stubborn, but they influence the other agents, so playing the role of
leaders [44]. We choose to consider separated communities so that each
follower cannot be influenced by leaders with significantly different risk
attitudes. Accordingly, each follower elects to emulate the strategy he
considers most profitable. The size of the communities is proportional to
the total wealth of their leaders and, inside each community, the richest
agents are more likely to activate links.
The interaction is triggered at a given time instant kt. Henceforth,
the dynamics of yi(k), i = 1, ..., N , described in (3-10), are strongly
influenced by the structure of the graph G describing the diffusion flow.
In turn, the structure of G is established at time kt, based on the current
wealth ri(kt), for i = 1, ..., N .
2More details on the interpretation of the risk attitude dynamics will be further
explained in 5.1.2
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3.3 Emerging Features
The proposed artificial financial market can take into account differ-
ent scenarios, in terms of both taxation schemes and interaction rules.
In order to test our market, we focus our attention on the effects of
agents’ interaction on the emerging features of the market. We aim at
identifying the possible interplay between taxation and interaction in
determining the trading volumes and the wealth distribution among the
agents, in order to check if the results are consistent with empirical evi-
dence. To do so, we compare the results of extensive simulations of Case
II against that of Case I. The effect of the alternative taxation schemes
are firstly pointed out in the case with no interactions. Then, we fo-
cus on adaptive agents and study the effects induced by the emulating
dynamics on both the wealth distribution and the trading volumes for
both taxation schemes.
To highlight the overall wealth dispersion induced by the two taxation
schemes, we use the Gini coefficient G(k), proposed by Corrado Gini in
[60] as a measure of inequality of income or wealth, which can be defined
as
G(k) = 1− 2
N − 1
(
N −
∑N
i=1 iri(k)∑N
i=1 ri(k)
)
, (3-11)
where the wealths ri(k), i = 1, . . . , N , are indexed in non-decreasing
order, that is, ri(k) ≤ ri+1(k). The Gini coefficient varies between 0,
which reflects complete equality, and 1, which indicates complete in-
equality (one person holds the all wealth, all others have none).
3.4 Simulation Results
To achieve statistical relevance, we run 1000 simulations for each sce-
nario and consider a number of time steps sufficient to reach steady-state
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wealth distribution.
We consider N = 1000 agents that share the same initial capital ri(0) =
100$, i = 1, . . . , N , and, at each trading session k, can decide to invest
a fraction  = 0.2 of their current wealth. The cardinality of the set of
assets is L = |L| = 4, that is, the agents can trade in three categories
of actual assets, while the fourth one corresponds to no-investment and,
therefore, has an unlimited availability. On the other hand, at every
time instant, each of the three actual assets has an availability equal
to 1/15th of the total wealth of the system. The win and loss rates
associated to the actual assets are selected so that the prudent agents(
0.5 ≤ yi(k) < 0.67
)
only consider investing in the first and less risky
asset, the ordinary agents
(
0.67 ≤ yi(k) < 0.83
)
also consider the second,
while the audacious agents
(
0.83 ≤ yi(k) ≤ 1
)
also find convenient
investing in the third and most risky one. Namely, the won rates are
a¯ = [1.53, 1.60, 1.67, 1], while the loss rates are b¯ = [0.60, 0.50, 0.40, 1].
The initial risk attitudes yi(0), i = 1, ..., N , are uniformly distributed in
the interval [0.5, 1].
Case I
In our numerical analysis, we monitor the effects of the alternative tax-
ation schemes on both the wealth distribution and the trading volumes
in the artificial market. Specifically, we observe that the TT scheme
hinders the audacious agents, favoring the prudent ones. This is clearly
depicted in Figure 3-1(a), which shows the sum of the average final
wealth in the three classes of agents, respectively. The opposite is ob-
served when a flat tax is adopted, in which the wealth distribution is
biased towards the ordinary and audacious agents, see Figure 3-1(b).
In other words, the TT scheme does not reward the risk, penalizing the
audacious agents, in opposition to the FT scheme, which encourages the
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Figure 3-1: Case I. Final wealth distribution when TT (a) and
FT (b) schemes are introduced, respectively.
agents to trade. As depicted in Figure 3-2(a), while the TT scheme
induces a wealth redistribution among the population, the FT scheme
increases inequalities. On the other hand, the TT scheme leads to lower
trading volumes at the steady-state, see Figure 3-2(b). The latter effect
is in line with the criticisms commonly made to financial transaction
taxes, which are blamed for possible market depression [10, 62, 86].
Case II
We assume that, after kt time steps in which the agents invest based
on their own risk attitude, the emulation dynamics described in (3-
10) are triggered. The triggering instant of the emulation behaviour is
indifferent to our purpose, as alternative values of kt only affect the size
of the communities, see Figure 3-3. The ten richest agents (the leaders)
are assumed to have only outgoing edges; the followers, instead, have
bidirectional edges with their neighbouring peers, and may have ingoing
edges from the leaders. To model this interaction mechanism, we build a
directed Baraba´si-Albert (BA) scale-free network [12], in which the hubs
coincide with the leaders. The network is split into three communities,
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Figure 3-2: Case I. Gini coefficient (a) and trading volumes (b)
when TT (blue line) and FT (red line) schemes are introduced,
respectively.
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Figure 3-3: Case II. Average number of leaders of belonging
to the communities 1 (red line), 2 (blue line) and 3 (green line)
for different interaction triggering time kt when TT (a) and FT
(b) schemes are introduced, respectively.
3.4 Simulation Results  51
Prudent Ordinary Audacious0
100
200
300
400
500
Class of agents
A
v
er
a
g
e
fi
n
a
l
w
ea
lt
h
(a)
Prudent Ordinary Audacious0
100
200
300
400
500
Class of agents
A
v
er
a
g
e
fi
n
a
l
w
ea
lt
h
(b)
Figure 3-4: Final wealth distribution when TT scheme is in-
troduced: Case I (a) and Case II (b), respectively. The width of
the bars is proportional to the numerosity of the classes.
led by the prudent, ordinary, and audacious leaders, respectively. The
size of each community is proportional to the sum of the leaders’ wealth,
which is an indirect measure of their influence.
The results are compared against a twin set of simulations in Case I,
sharing the same set of realizations of the stochastic processes βj , j ∈ L,
for each trader, and at each time instant. For the sake of clarity, we ana-
lyze the two taxation schemes separately, starting with the TT scheme.
From Figure 3-4, we observe that this taxation system, regardless of
the interactions among the agents, recompenses the prudent strategies
in the long run. The emulating the rich interaction, instead, skews the
distribution among the communities, see Figure 3-5.
In absence of leaders, the interaction with the neighbors would tend
to average the agents’ attitudes towards risk. However, the presence
of leaders differentiates the communities. In particular, the community
guided by the prudent leaders preserves a significant number of prudent
agents (the 14% of the total population of the community, see Table 3.4).
Consequently, the average wealth of the agents in the first community
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Figure 3-5: Case II, TT scheme. Screenshots of the three com-
munities before (left panel) and after (right panel) the agents’ in-
teraction in a sample simulation. The red, blue, and green nodes
correspond to prudent, ordinary, and audacious agents, respec-
tively. Notice that the averaging of the attitudes increases the
overall density of ordinary agents. However, the leaders’ influence
skews the distribution across the communities, with prudent and
audacious agents still populating the first and third community,
respectively.
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Figure 3-6: Average final wealth of the agents belonging to
communities 1, 2 and 3, when TT scheme is introduced: Case I
(a) and Case II (b), respectively.
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Figure 3-7: Trading volumes when TT scheme is introduced:
Case I (blue line) and Case II (red line), respectively.
is considerably higher compared with the other two communities (see
Figure 3-6(b)), whose leaders pursue risky strategies which turn to be
unprofitable in the long term (their steady-state capital is lower then
the average agents’ wealth r¯ = 100, see Table 3.4).
Moreover, Figure 3-7 shows that the emulation mechanism has the fur-
ther effect of mitigating the decrease in trading volumes typical of the
TT case. This is due to the reduction of the total number of prudent
agents illustrated in Figure 3-4.
Differently from the TT Case, in which the prudent agents slowly but
relentlessly take the leadership of the market, see Figure 3-3(a), when
the flat tax is introduced, a prudent strategy is disadvantageous both
in the short and in the long term, see Figure 3-3(b). Consequently,
no agent is encouraged to emulate the prudent agents, and the market
splits into only two communities, guided by the ordinary and audacious
leaders, respectively. Accordingly, there are no notable differences in the
average wealth of the two communities, see Table 3.4. We emphasize
that, while the emulating dynamics can strongly influence the distribu-
tion of the wealth across the communities, the overall wealth distribution
is only dictated by the taxation scheme. In particular, the variation of
the Gini coefficient induced by the emulation dynamics is an order of
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magnitude lower than that induced by a change of taxation scheme, for
any possible value of the interaction weight λ and of the average degree
of the connection topology.
We remark that considering disconnected communities is an idealization
of real-world aggregations, where few weak links may still connect the
communities. However, all the presented results are robust to the addi-
tion of links connecting the communities. This is confirmed by a twin
set of simulations in which a small fraction (less than 5%) of the net-
work edges are rewired following a degree-preserving procedure inspired
by the work in [73]. Considering 95% confidence intervals, we find that
the variations of the results are not statistically significant.
Summing up, the numerical analysis replicates the well known benefits
and drawbacks of the two taxation schemes, and the analyzed emerg-
ing features are in line with empirical evidence. Namely, we observe
a trade-off between wealth redistribution and trading volumes: while
the Tobin-like tax has the effect of redistributing the wealth among the
agents, but reduces the trading volumes, the opposite happens with a
flat tax, which encourages to invest, but dramatically increases the dis-
parity among the agents. Moreover, while the TT scheme favores the
prudent agents investing only in the less risky assets, the FT scheme
rewards the audacious agents, that also consider investing in the riskiest
assets. In the other case, where the adaptive agents consider adjusting
their risk attitude and the consequent trading strategy, we observe a
significant impact of the agents interactions on the emerging features of
the market. Indeed, the richest agents, recognized as the market lead-
ers, form separate communities. Notably, the communities benefit from
the presence of leaders with successful trading strategies, and are more
likely to increase their average wealth. Moreover, this imitation behav-
ior mitigates the reduction of the trading volumes typical of Tobin-like
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Tobin Tax
Community 1 2 3
r¯I(T )/r¯ 1.01 0.97 0.98
[0.99, 1.02] [0.96, 0.99] [0.97, 1.00]
r¯II(T )/r¯ 1.40 0.74 0.71
[1.38, 1.42] [0.73, 0.75] [0.70, 0.73]
νci 380.76 347.63 271.61
[369.89, 391.01] [336.54, 357.92] [260.91, 281.71]
f1(%) 20.29 0.60 0.01
[19.78, 20.80] [0.53, 0.66] [0.01, 0.02]
f2(%) 79.71 99.40 93.04
[79.20, 80.21] [99.32, 99.45] [92.67, 93.41]
f3(%) 0 0 6.95
[6.58, 7.32]
Flat Tax
Community 1 2 3
r¯I(T )/r¯ 0 1.07 0.97
[1.01, 1.13] [0.94, 1.01]
r¯II(T )/r¯ 0 1.05 0.98
[0.99, 1.11] [0.95, 1.01]
νci 0 246.24 753.76
[235.76, 256.19] [742.78, 763.20]
f1(%) 0 0.80 0
[0.69, 0.92]
f2(%) 0 99.16 93.13
[99.04, 99.27] [92.95, 93.32]
f3(%) 0 0.04 6.87
[0.03, 0.06] [6.68, 7.05]
Table 3-1: r¯I(T ) and r¯II(T ) are the average final wealth in Case
I and Case II, respectively; νci is the average numerosity of the
i-th community, i = 1, 2, 3; fj is the final percentage of agents
belonging to the j-th class, j = 1, 2, 3. Confidence intervals with
significance level 0.05 are also reported.
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Leaders L1 L2 L3
r¯l(T )/r¯ 7.69 0.66 0.64
Tobin Tax [7.18,8.19] [0.59,0.72] [0.37,0.90]
νli 4.30 3.20 2.50
[4.20,4.40] [3.10,3.29] [2.41,2.59]
r¯l(T )/r¯ 0 14.29 14.48
Flat Tax [12.60,15.98] [13.24,15.71]
νli 0 3.03 6.97
[2.94,3.12] [6.88, 7.06]
Table 3-2: r¯l(T ) is the average final wealth of the leaders in the
focal scenario; νli is the average numerosity of the leaders of the
i-th community, i = 1, 2, 3. Confidence intervals with significance
level 0.05 are also reported.
taxes, while preserving its redistributive effect.
CHAPTER 4
Informational Cascades: an
Overview
We are influenced by others in almost every activity, and this includes
investments and financial transactions. Such influence may be entirely
rational, but investors are often accused of irrationally converging their
actions and beliefs.
The word “herding” is defined to include any behavior similarity brought
by the interaction of individuals. People’s thoughts, feelings, and actions
can be influenced by others by several means, as observations of actions,
observations of the consequences of actions, such as individual’s payoffs,
direct communications, reputations, and so on.
Payoff externalities, indeed, may drive the decisions of agents for which
stocks they acquire information. Under certain circumstances, agents
find it worthwhile to acquire further information only if other agents do.
Agents thus herd on information acquisition (or lack thereof). Herding
can also be caused by principal-agent concerns. Managerial performance
evaluation is often based on relative not absolute performance. Typi-
cally, this behavior show that each agent prefers to mimic the actions of
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other traders, completely ignoring private information, to avoid being
revealed to be of low-ability [39]. This process of imitation and social
learning may lead the agents in a blind replication of the same actions.
This phenomenon is generally known as “informational cascade”. They
describes a condition in which imitation will occur with certainty. An
individual is said to be in an informational cascade if, based upon his
observation of others (e.g., their actions, outcomes, or words), his se-
lected action does not depend on his private information signal [15]. In
such a situation, his action choice is uninformative to later observers.
Thus, cascades tend to be associated with information blockages. Even
a simple form of social interaction as imitation offers a crucial benefit:
it allows an individual to exploit information possessed by others about
the environment. Indeed, the idea is that people gain useful information
from observing previous agents’ decisions, to the point where they opti-
mally and rationally completely ignore their own private information.
In the literature, the notions of informational cascades and herd be-
havior are often considered equivalent, but this two concepts are quite
distinct. Banerjee, for instance, uses the term “herd” for what we refer
as a cascade [11]. However, Avery and Zemsky [7] pointed out this dif-
ference. They defined an informational cascade as a situation where all
the traders act ignoring their private information, whereas an agent is
said to herd if, as a result of observing the actions of others, he makes
a different choice from the one that he would make initially.
Starting from the nineties, several models of informational cascades have
been proposed [7, 11, 126, 137, 28]. In most of these works, the basic
principle which illustrates the occurring of an informational cascade is
the following: consider a sequence of ex ante identical individuals who
face similar choices, observe conditionally independent and identically
distributed private information signals, and who observe the actions but
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not the payoffs of predecessors. Suppose that individual i is in a cascade,
and that later individuals understand this. Then individual i+1, having
gained no information by observing the choice of i, is, informationally, in
a position identical to that of i. So i+ 1 will also make the same choice
regardless of his private signal. By induction, this reasoning extends
to all later individuals, and the accumulation of information comes to
a screeching halt once a cascade begins. Thus, the occurrence of an
informational cascade translates into a sudden transition toward the
same behavior.
In the following, we choose to present the details of the BHW model
[15], which is considered the masterpiece among the models of informa-
tional cascades. Namely, most of the subsequent models are based on
its mechanism. Then, some considerations on the limits of the existing
models follows.
4.1 The BHW Model
The following are the main assumptions in BHW model for analyzing
the onset of informational cascades.
 A number n of agents is considered. Each agent has to make
a trading decision in a sequential order, which is an exogenous
factor.
 All investors decide whether to invest or not to invest in an asset.
The purpose for investment is to achieve the profit maximization.
 Each agent can observe the decisions of all those ahead of him, and
make his own decision. There is a sequence of investment decisions
by all the investor and the ordering is exogenous and is known to
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all. There is no other form of information exchange among the
traders.
 The agents obtain information by observing the investment deci-
sion ahead of them. This information is known as public informa-
tion.
 The agents make their decisions in an uncertain situation, which
means the investment profit V is uncertain when they decide to
invest. Investment profit depends on the actual value of invest-
ment property, which is not known to investors when they make
decisions.
 The two possible realizations of the investment properties are good
situation G and bad situation B. Return on investment by the real
value of investment properties as a good situation G is formulated
as V = 1. When the investment property is in bad situation B,
the investment return is formulated as V = 0.
 If the trader chooses to invest, it will result in some costs C. In
the model C = 0.5, the costs are the same for all the investors. If
the agent chooses not to invest, there will be no such costs.
 There is a prior probability of each situation (good situation and
bad situation). The probability of the selection of investment in
good situation and the probability of non-investment in bad situ-
ation is equal to 0.5.
 Each investor has his private signal (private information) about
the actual value of investment, which is not observable by other
investors. If the agents make investment decisions according to
their own private signal, then this signal will be feedback into his
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investment decisions. In good situation investors may invest, while
in bad situation they may not invest. The amount of private sig-
nal has the characteristics of duality. Each agent’s private signal
X contains two values: H for the high precision (the possibility
p is greater than 0.5), L for the low-precision (the probability is
1−p ≤ 0.5 ). Private signal can be transmitted through the invest-
ment behavior of investors. Namely, subsequent agents can infer
the private signal of their predecessors by observing the trading ac-
tions of the latter. This means that, although transmittable, the
information cannot be 100% transmitted. Therefore, the charac-
teristics of information transmission meets with the conditions of
0.5 ≤ p ≤ 1, which means that is very difficult for investors to rely
only on their own private information to make accurate decisions.
The limitations of information’s transmission require the investors to
make a decision, based not only on private signal but also on the deci-
sions of other investors. By using Bayesian theorem [115], the traders can
make prior probability of real value of investment properties to posterior
probability, and use the posterior probability to calculate the expected
return on investment in order to make investment decision. Assume that
γ is the posterior probability if the return of investment is V = 1. The
expected investment income E[V ] is then
E[V ] = γ × 1 + (1− γ)× 0 = γ. (4-1)
Expected return minus the investment cost C is the expected net profit P
of the investment. Investment behavior can be divided into the following
three types:
1) when P > 0, investor chooses to invest;
2) when P = 0, investor can choose to invest, or not to invest;
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3) when P > 0, then investor chooses not to invest.
Through the analysis of the BHW model we can see that, when investors
ignore their own signals and follow the decisions of the other investors,
the informational cascade occurs. Also in Banerjee [11], which differs
from the BHW model for the type of choice (the agents have to choose
a number from an interval rather than having a binary choice), if two
agents choose the same action, every subsequent agent will make the
same choice, regardless of the signal he received. Imitation dominates
private information.
To see how likely it is that a cascade occurs, consider the situation in
which private signals are very noisy; specifically, the probability that the
signal is correct is p = 0.51. A cascade occurs with slightly more than
75% after the first two players. After eight players, the probability that
individuals are in a cascade increases up to 0.996. More generally, even
when individuals have more accurate signals, the information contained
in a cascade is not substantially better than a single individual’s signal.
4.2 Considerations
The BHW and Banerjee models are, in their simplicity, very useful in
the general understanding of some kinds of phenomena which can be
observed in real world, such as fads, preference effects as in the choice
of technologies, research topics, and eventually financial bubbles and
crushes. In other words, they represent a useful stylized description of
the process of social learning. However, the simplifying assumptions
made in these models share some criticisms that need to be analyzed
and revised.
First of all, these models are static models, thus they do not capture the
dynamic adaptation and learning process of the agents.
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Another aspect to point out is that, in a real investment context, the
assumption that the timing and order of moves is exogenously given is
unrealistic. Actually, when individuals have a choice of whether to delay,
there can be long periods with no investment, followed by sudden spasms
in which the action on one agent triggers the exercise of the investment
option by many others. Moreover, the assumption of exogenous sequence
generates what is called as “path dependence” [16]: the outcome of the
cascade (good or bad cascade) strongly depends upon the sequence of
movies.
Another implication of these models is the so-called “idiosyncrasy”: be-
havior resulting from signals of just the first few individuals drastically
affects the behavior of all the subsequent followers. Of course, the idea
that a few people are able to successfully influence the whole population
is almost extreme (even the most influential dictators in history did not
succeed to achieve this goal).
Of course, in reality we do not expect a cascade to last forever. Several
possible kinds of shocks could dislodge a cascade: for example, the arrival
of better informed individuals, the release of new public information,
and shifts in the underlying value of adoption versus rejection. Indeed,
when participants know that they are in a cascade, they also know that
the cascade is based on little information relative to the information of
private individuals. Hence, even after an informational cascade have
persisted for a long time, it can be overturned with comparatively little
effort. The alternation of fads is a clear example of how fragile a cascade
could be.
Another fact to point out is the possible influence of the price dynam-
ics on the onset of informational cascades. This aspect is not taken into
account in [11, 15]. Conversely, in [7] the authors highlight that an infor-
mational cascade never takes place when prices adjust to reflect avail-
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able information. Also Cipriani and Guarino [27] test experimentally
herd behavior in asset markets with flexible prices, pointing out that
the competitive price mechanism significantly reduced the occurrence
of informational cascades. However, other experimental results seem to
contradict this theory. In [43], for instance, the authors find that agents
frequently acts against the market and their private information. Our
suggestion is that the implications of such factor on informational cas-
cades should be better analyzed. However, we have to point out that
there exists a huge literature on the modeling of price dynamics, see [76]
for a review, which shows that modeling price mechanism is not a simple
task.
There is some doubt, eventually, as to whether these models have prop-
erly identified the usual source of difference in behavior across groups.
Hence, they only consider the quite unrealistic case case of a total in-
formational cascade, completely disregarding the possible differences in
mass behavior across groups, or clusters, of agents. Actually, different
groups may have different tendencies, different conversation patterns;
the information may spread among the agents with different intensities,
depending on the type and strength of interactions among the agents.
In financial context, for instance, empirical evidence that herding phe-
nomena do not involve all agents at the same time abounds [70, 127].
Summing up, the classical models of informational cascades share some
unrealistic assumptions that need to be complemented in such way. Our
aim is that of approaching to this phenomenon from a different perspec-
tive: we will focus on informational cascades from a control viewpoint.
We will propose a dynamic model which allows to generate informational
cascades of different intensities. This approach will allow us to exploit
our background in the field of control theory in order to overcome some
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of the limitations of the aforementioned models, such as path depen-
dence, or the unrealistic case of total informational cascades. In the
next chapters, we extensively explain the details and the advantages of
our approach.
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CHAPTER 5
A New Model of Opinion
Dynamics
Models of social networks are structures made up of individuals that
are tied based on their interdependency. Such models explain the confi-
dence or influence flow in populations without relying on detailed social
psychological findings. The process of opinion dynamics evolves along
the networks of social influence and affects the structure of the network
itself. In the field of social networks, opinion dynamics is of high in-
terest in many areas including politics, as in voting prediction; physics,
as in spinning particles; sociology, as in the diffusion of innovation, the
electronic exchange of personal information, and language change; and
finally economics. That’s why the study of opinion dynamics has re-
cently started to attract also the attention of the control community,
whose main challenge is represented by the analysis of the stability prop-
erties of the proposed models, in particular, convergence of the agents’
opinions, as shown in some of the most recent contributions in this field
[56, 63, 101, 107].
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5.1 A Brief Survey on Opinion Dynamics
In the literature, two general lines of research have been proposed in or-
der to explain the dynamics of opinion consensus or disagreement. The
first one includes many models of opinion dynamics based on “bounded
confidence”, which means that an individual only interacts with those
whose opinions are close enough to its own. This idea reflects the psycho-
logical concept called selective exposure. Broadly defined, “selective ex-
posure refers to behaviors that bring the communication content within
reach of one’s sensory apparatus” [139]. The other line of research fo-
cuses on the “obstinacy” of agents: in general, an agent neither simply
shares nor strictly disregards the opinion of any other agent, but takes
into account the opinions of others to a certain extent in forming his
own opinion.
In what follows, we briefly overview these two lines of research, starting
from the respective pioneer works.
5.1.1 Bounded Confidence Models
Recently, bounded confidence (BC) models of opinion dynamics, a la-
bel coined by Krause in 1998 [69], have received significant attention.
BC models are models of continuous opinion dynamics in which agents
have bounded confidence in others opinions. The first version of BC
models was formulated by Hegselmann and Krause [63], called the HK
model, where agents synchronously update their opinions by averaging
all opinions in their confidence bound:
x˙i(t) =
∑
j:|xj(t)−xi(t)|<d
(
xj(t)− xi(t)
)
, (5-1)
with d > 0.
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The other popular version of BC models was developed and investigated
by Deffuant and Weisbuch [125], called the DW model. The HK and
DW models are very similar, but they differ in their update rule: in the
DW model a pairwise-sequential updating procedure is employed instead
of the synchronized one. In the HK model, the set of neighbors of an
agent is defined as those agents whose opinions differ from his opinion
by less than a confidence bound. Hence, this model is dealing with
endogenously changing topologies, that is, state dependent or changing
from inside, in contrast to the exogenously changing topologies. The HK
models are classified based on various factors: a model is called agent- or
density-based if its number of agents is finite or infinite, respectively, and
a model is called homogeneous or heterogeneous if its confidence bounds
are uniform or agent-dependent, respectively. The convergence of both
agent- and density-based homogeneous HK models are discussed in [17],
while the agent-based homogeneous HK system is proved to reach a fixed
state in finite time [41], Based on this model of opinion dynamics, which
main feature is that of considering a state-dependent topology, several
interesting works followed, see for instance [89, 22, 133, 117].
5.1.2 Models of Opinion Pooling
One of the first who analyzed consensus of individuals’ opinion was De-
Groot [34], who proposed Eq. (2-8) as a model of opinion dynamics. It
is actually an iterative scheme of opinion pooling in which each agent
updates his opinion based on his own and neighbors’ current opinion.
This model was extended by Friedkin and Johnsen (FJ) [55], who in-
troduced the concept of agents’ susceptibility to interpersonal influence,
and also provided an estimation of the agents’ opinion at equilibrium.
FJ model in matrix form is described as
x(k + 1) = ΛWx(k) + (IN − Λ)x(0), (5-2)
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where W is a row stochastic matrix of interpersonal influences, and
0 ≤ Λ ≤ IN is a diagonal matrix of agents’ susceptibilities to the social
influence.
The natural and intensively investigated special case of this model as-
sumes the coupling condition λii = 1−wii ∀ i, that is, Λ = IN−diag(W ).
Under this assumption, the selfweight wii plays a special role, considered
to be a measure of stubborness or closure of the i-th agent to interper-
sonal influence. If wii = 1, and thus wij = 0 ∀ j 6= i, then he is
maximally stubborn and completely ignores opinions of his neighbors.
Conversely, if wii = 0, and thus his susceptibility is maximal (λii = 1),
the agent is completely open to interpersonal influence, attaching no
weight to his own opinion. Thus, the susceptibility of the i-th agent
λii varies between 0 and 1, where the extremal values correspond to
maximally stubborn and open-minded agents, respectively.
Starting from this simple model of opinion dynamics, several models fol-
lowed. Some of them investigates the presence of leaders in the popula-
tion, and their effects on opinion consensus [68, 85, 90, 118, 58]. Another
interesting framework concentrates on a class of randomized dynamics
[108, 54, 49, 109, 112]. In [54], for instance, the authors propose a model
inspired to the FJ model where nodes interact in randomly chosen pairs,
following the so called gossip protocol [18]. At each time step, a ran-
domly chosen agent updates its opinion to a convex combination of its
own opinion, the opinion of one of its neighbors, and its own initial opin-
ion or “prejudice”. They show that the dynamics persistently oscillates;
however, the result is a stable opinion profile on average. This stability
property guarantees that the dynamics, although affected by persistent
random oscillations, possesses an ergodic behavior. For an overview on
randomized algorithms for opinion formation, see [53] and the references
therein. Another interesting concept in models of opinion dynamics as in
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(2-8) is that of democratic consensus, which is introduced and discussed
in [48].
One of the limitations of most of the models of opinion dynamics are
the strong assumptions on the graph of interactions required to reach
consensus. Just as an example, in [88] the authors study consensus
of a multi-agent system with cooperative-antagonistic interactions and
switching topologies in a discrete-time setting. Both unidirectional and
bidirectional topologies are considered. It was proven that the limits
of all agent states exist and reach a consensus only if the topology is
uniformly jointly strongly connected or infinitely jointly connected. Of
course, in real applications these assumptions are quite unrealistic.
However, an interesting benefit of the FJ model is that, despite being a
simple model, it is actually a very flexible model which may be adopted
in various contexts. In our artificial market, we have translated the
agents’ interaction as a variation of the risk attitude due to the neigh-
bors’ influence. This interaction mechanism has been described by Eq.
(3-10), which is actually equivalent to the FJ model of opinion dynam-
ics (5-2). Indeed, the risk attitude in its general meaning can be seen
as a human dynamical feature which may be affected by different fac-
tors. Undoubtedly, there is a innate predisposition which characterize
each person, and which depends on the character, education, life expe-
rience, and so on. Moreover, people’s attitude toward risk is inevitably
influenced by exogenous and environmental factors, and overall by the
interaction with other people. That’s why we leverage the FJ model
to capture the evolution of the agents’ risk attitude, which is updated
taking into account both their innate predisposition, described by y(0),
and the interaction with other people, described in the matrix of inter-
personal influences W .
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5.2 The Model
From now on, we introduce the main contributions of this thesis. In or-
der to study informational cascades from a control viewpoint, we see this
phenomenon as a result of a diffusion of a certain opinion in an ensem-
ble of agents. To do this, we propose a new model of opinion dynamics
which allows us to see informational cascades as a consensus problem.
In this model, we will try to embed some of the main features of herding
and of the consequent informational cascades, and, at the same time,
to overcome some limitations of the models of informational cascades
already present in the literature. As already pointed out in Section 4.2,
one of the limitations of these models lies in the fact that eventually
all the agents are involved in the triggered informational cascade. Un-
doubtedly, this perspective is almost unrealistic, as shown by empirical
evidence. These observations lead us to consider the more realistic case
of “partial informational cascade” as the partial diffusion of a common
opinion in an ensemble of agents.
Differently from the classical models of informational cascades, which are
static models based on bayesian rules, we propose a dynamic networked
model in which each agent interact with some other agents, and this
interaction biases his opinion.
Exploiting the well established link between multi-agent systems and
graph theory [13], and to be compliant with the models of opinion dy-
namics, we see each trader as a node of a dynamical network and use
the network edges to model the influence among the agents.
In our model, the state of each node i is described by two variables,
xi(k) and ri(k). The former captures the opinion of agent i, while the
latter his reputation. We model the interaction and the mutual influence
among the agents as a directed graph G(V, E , {αij(k)}i,j∈V), where each
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node i of the set V represents an agent, and the generic edge eij is
encompassed in the edge set E if the opinion of node i depends on that
of node j. Moreover, the influence of the opinion of the other agents on
the opinion of agent i is weighted through the coefficient
αij
(
r(k)
)
=
rj(k)∑
h∈Ni rh(k)
, (5-3)
where Ni defines the set of in-neighbors of i (see Def. 2.1.4).
We consider the following dynamics for the state variables xi(k) and
ri(k):{
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) +
∑
j∈Ni αij
(
r(k)
)(
xj(k)− xi(k)
)
,
ri(k + 1) = f
(
ri(k), ui(k), vi(k)
)
.
(5-4)
We model through f
(
ri(k), ui(k), vi(k)
)
the dependence of an agent’s
reputation from his actions ui(k) and exogenous factors vi(k), constrain-
ing the vector field f to describe a positive system to ensure the repu-
tation of an agent be positive.
By doing so, the dynamics of xi(k) becomes that of a directed network
of diffusively coupled integrators with state dependent gains. We can
leverage the topology of this network to represent people with different
opinion formation schemes. Namely, we model the agents who are not
willing to let their opinion be influenced by that of the other agents as
the set R := {i : Ni = ∅} of nodes with zero indegree. The nodes of
R, having outgoing edges, play the role of leaders, as they are capable
of influencing the opinion of other people. On the contrary, nodes with
high indegree may represent the influencees, that is, individuals who are
subject to the influence of the mass, thus uniforming their ideas and
opinions with those of the majority of the population. Finally, nodes
with low, but nonzero indegree model agents who, conscious of their lack
of experience and information, follow the opinion of a small set of peers
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which they consider experts and clever. Consistently, the outdegree
measures the potential of an individual of influencing the population,
while his actual ability of influencing his peers is related to his reputation
ri(k) through the coefficient αij
(
r(k)
)
in Eq. (5-3). The larger ri(k), the
stronger the influence that i exerts on the nodes connected to him. In
this way, the agents’ reputation becomes a measure of the influence that
the agents exert on their peers, and thus we capture from a dynamical
viewpoint the tendency of people to follow the actions of individuals with
high reputation, which is considered one of the main causes of herding
behavior [39].
We emphasize that this model is a general model of opinion dynamics
which can be embed in different contexts and situations where an en-
semble of individuals have to reach a consensus on a certain opinion
(e.g. voting). In the next chapter, we will use this model in a financial
context, showing its ability in reproducing herding phenomena.
CHAPTER 6
Informational Cascade as a
Pinning Control Problem
In what follows, we show how the proposed model of opinion dynamics
succeeds in reproducing informational cascades of different intensities.
First, we show how the model allows to view informational cascades
as a pinning control problem. Then, exploiting tools from partial pin-
ning control (Sec. 2.4), we predict the magnitude of the triggered in-
formational cascades. We propose a numerical application to test the
effectiveness of our predictions.
To reproduce partial informational cascades, we populate network (5-4)
with two categories of agents: informed and followers. These qualita-
tively correspond to the extreme types of actors in the FJ model (5-2).
Informed agents are stubborn and thus their opinion dynamics is not
influenced by other people; conversely, the followers completely disre-
gard their opinion and only take into account that of their neighbors.
To be compliant with the classical models of informational cascades, we
assume the presence of an external information injected on a subset of
the network nodes. We model the exogenous information as an exter-
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nal signal x¯ fed by an additional node only to a subset of the agents,
say I ⊆ R, which then play the role of informed agents. From these
influencers, the information diffuses through the network, affecting the
agents’ decision making. This choice allows us to see herding dynamics
as a pinning control problem, with the additional node playing the role
of the pinner, and the informed nodes being in the role of pinned nodes.
Consistently, Eq. (5-4) may be rewritten as
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) +
∑
j∈Ni αij
(
r(k)
)(
xj(k)− xi(k)
)
+δi(x¯− xi(k)),
ri(k + 1) = f
(
ri(k), ui(k), vi(k)
)
,
(6-1)
where δi = 1 for all i ∈ I, and δi = 0 for all i /∈ I.
By constraining I to be a subset of R, the informed agents will only be
influenced by the exogenous signal x¯, thus disregarding their own beliefs
and the opinion of the other investors.
To model the effect of each agent’s opinion on his behavior, we define
the agent decision as a generic outpout si(k) of system (6-1):
si(k) = g
(
xi(k)
)
. (6-2)
The function g, of course, may be explicated depending on the context.
For the informed influencers, we will have that si(k) = g(x¯) = s¯, ∀i ∈ I,
and ∀k > 0. As Eq. (6-1) is that of a diffusive process over a directed
network of discrete integrators, it may well be the case that the opinion of
an additional set of nodes converges to that of the informed agents, thus
ensuring that also the decisions si(k) of the former replicate that of the
latter, that is, s¯. The larger the set of nodes C which reaches consensus
to the opinion of the informed agents, the larger the magnitude of the
herding phenomenon that is generated. Hence, to understand the ability
of the model in eqs. (6-1)-(6-2) of generating informational cascades of
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different magnitudes, we shall study the variation of the number of nodes
whose opinion converges to that of the informed agents, in dependence
of the selection of the set I. Note that, as I ⊆ C, then C 6= ∅.
Unfortunately, as already pointed out in Sec. 2.3, while the literature
on pinning control is extremely vast, no results hold for dynamics like
that in Eq. (6-1), where xi(k) evolves according to a discrete-time and
state dependent law. Hence, no results in the literature provide tools to
accurately predict our diffusion process. Still, given the set of pinned
nodes I, we can rely on the topological conditions available in the litera-
ture to predict the number of nodes which should reach consensus to the
pinner’s opinion. In particular, we use the pinned node selection algo-
rithm proposed in [37] (see Section 2.4.1), which translates the problem
of maximizing the number of pinning controlled nodes into an optimiza-
tion problem on a graph. To do so, it relies on the following structural
condition: a node is pinning controllable if all of the RSCCs (see Def.
2.1.16) in its upstream encompass at least a pinned node. Hence, the
algorithm selects the set of p RSCCs to be pinned that maximize the
number of nodes fulfilling such condition. To allow numerical solvabil-
ity, this graph optimization is translated into an integer linear program.
Then, we numerically verify if, considering the dynamics in Eq. (6-1)
which does not fulfill the hypothesis of partial pinning control, yields re-
sults that are consistent with these structural conditions. To do this, we
test our model of opinion dynamics in the artificial market proposed in
Chapter 3. We show that, by selecting the nodes of the set I according
to the partial pinning control algorithm, our opinion dynamics model
succeeds in generating herding phenomena of different and predictable
intensities in our artificial financial market.
In what follows, we propose the financial application of our model of
opinion dynamics.
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6.1 An Application to our Artificial Financial
Market
The artificial market proposed in Section 3.1 is populated by N agents,
and we select a directed weighted graph G(V, E , {αij(k)}i,j∈V) to model
the mutual influence among them. Notice that, while the network struc-
ture is fixed, (G and E are time-invariant), the interaction weights are
time-varying. This assumption is reasonable if we think that we are
dealing with informational cascades, which are phenomena occurring on
a short time scale. Thus, we can assume that in a brief period of time
the pattern of relationships of each agent is keeping fixed, even though
the intensity of such relations may change.
At each time step k = 1, ..., T , the agents, in a sequential random order,
can trade in a set of financial assets L, with |L| = L. Notice that T
is selected high enough so that, on average, no one is favored by the
trading sequence. The assets are characterized by stochastic returns
β = [β1, ..., βL] and by a limited availability. We denote with x¯ = E[β]
the expected return of the assets, which is assumed to be constant1, and
relabel the assets in L such that x¯1 > x¯2 > ... > x¯L.
In line with the proposed model of opinion dynamics (Eq. (6-1)), the
state of each trader i is described by two state variables. As we are in
a financial context, we assume that the vector xi(k) = [x
1
i (k), ..., x
L
i (k)]
represents the current evaluation of the asset returns made by agent
i, while the scalar ri(k) quantifies his reputation. it is reasonable to
assume that the latter coincides with the agent’s current wealth, whose
1As already pointed out in Section 4.2, we are aware that price dynamics is an
important market feature which may influence the onset of cascades. However, much
effort should be spent in order to build a model of price mechanism. That’s why in
this study we will not take into account this issue. However, this could be object of
further research.
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dynamics is described in Eqs. (3-5) - (3-6): the richer the agent, the
more prone his neighbors are to take into account his opinion.
As to the first state variable, notice that, at a first instance, we had
assumed that all the agents have the correct information on the assets’
return. From now on, we remove this hypothesis, assuming that each
agent has a personal evaluation on the assets, and thus associates dif-
ferent probability distributions to the assets’ return. This more realistic
behavior allows to be compliant with the classical models of informa-
tional cascades, in which the opinion of an investor is affected by ex-
ogeneous information. Actually, in this context, this information may
represent the correct evaluation of the expected asset returns x¯ fed by
a virtual trader, the pinner, only to the subset I of influencers, the so
called informed traders.
As in Section 3.1.2, the agents determine their trading strategy maximiz-
ing their expected utility. Without loss of generality, we now populate
our market of risk neutral investors [64, 66]. From a mathematical point
of view, this means setting the risk attitude of each agent yi(k) = 1,∀i, k
in Eq. (3-1). In the view of this, the expected utility that agent i asso-
ciates to the assets becomes:
E
[
Ui(k)
]
= ri(k)xi(k), (6-3)
with xi(k) = 0.5
(
ai(k) + bi(k)
)
being the current evaluation of the asset
returns made by agent i, and  being the fraction of current wealth that
each agent is prone to invest. Accordingly, the trading preferences si(k)
of agent i in (3-3) become an output of xi(k), in line with Eq. (6-2).
Namely, the opinion of each agent on the expected returns of the assets
reflects in his trading strategy. Consistently, (3-4) becomes
sji (k) := m : ∃ m− 1 xli(k) > xji (k), ∃ L−m xli(k) < xji (k). (6-4)
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Due to the limited availability of the assets, the actual trading action
made by agent i corresponds to trade in the first available asset l∗ ac-
cording to his preferences si(k), and thus the outcome of the trade is a
realization of βl
∗
.
In the view of these considerations, Eq. (6-1) can be rewritten as
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) +
∑
j∈Ni αij
(
r(k)
)(
xj(k)− xi(k)
)
+δi
(
x¯− xi(k)
)
,
ri(k + 1) = f
(
ri(k), β
l∗ , τ(k)
)
,
(6-5)
where τ(k) is the exogenous factor representing the selected taxation
scheme which affects the current wealth (see Eq. (3-6)).
6.1.1 Herding Intensity
To test the ability of the proposed model of triggering herding phenom-
ena of different magnitudes, we perform a set of numerical simulations
in which we vary the number of pinned nodes p = |I|. We vary p be-
tween one and the minimal value of influencers required to generate an
informational cascade that involves all the agents. In each simulation,
say the p-th, the set I(p) is selected according to the pinned node selec-
tion algorithm proposed in [37]. On the basis of topological conditions,
this algorithm maximizes the cardinality |C(p)| of the set C(p) of nodes
which should reach consensus to the pinner’s value. We stress that, as
the dynamics of xi(k) in Eq. (6-5) do not fulfill the assumptions made
in [37], the set Co(p) of nodes that will actually achieve consensus on the
state of the pinner in the p-th simulation could be different from the set
C(p).
We recall that, for the informed traders, xi(k) = x¯, and thus si(k) =
s¯ = [1, ..., L] ∀i ∈ I, and ∀k > 0. On the other hand, the opinion,
and consequently the trading action, of the influencees depends on that
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of their peers. We say that an influencee herds when he uniforms his
trading strategy to that of the informed agents. For each simulation
p, the set of the agents involved in the triggered informational cascade
from a certain time step k∗ is then defined as
H(p) := {i ∈ V : si(k) = s¯, ∀k > k∗}. (6-6)
Thus, H(p) is the observed set of nodes the trading strategy of which
coincides with that of the pinner in the last T − k∗ iterations.
For each simulation, we measure the magnitude of the triggered informa-
tional cascade through the LSV index [72], a well-established measure
of the strength of herding phenomena. It is defined as
LSV (p) =
∣∣∣∣ |H(p)|N − b
∣∣∣∣ , (6-7)
where b refers to the fraction of agents who have correct preferences of
the assets in the no-herding case, that is, when p = 0.
6.2 Simulations’ Setting
In order to select an appropriate topology of interactions for this context,
one could try to reconstruct the network starting from epirical data.
However, this is a well known hard task, and for the moment is out of
our scope. That’s why we performed numerical simulations on several
real network topologies, as we want to highlight the robustness of our
model to any topology of interactions. In what follows, we extensively
illustrate the case of a selected real network topology. However, later on
we will briefly show some evidence of other topologies, in order to prove
that in every case we have obtained the same qualitative results. In line
with the selected network, we consider a market populated by N = 1057
agents endowed with the same initial wealth ri(0) = 100$, ∀i = 1, ..., N .
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At each iteration k = 1, ..., T = 5000, each agent is prone to trade the
fraction  = 0.2 of his current wealth ri(k) in one of the L = 4 categories
of financial assets. Each category is characterized by an availability equal
to 1/15th of the total wealth of the system, except for the fourth asset,
which is a virtual asset and correspond to no-investment, and thus has
an unlimited availability. In line with our scenario, the expected returns
of the assets are x¯1 = 1.065, x¯2 = 1.050, x¯3 = 1.035, and x¯4 = 1.
All the agents have a distorted initial perception of the expected returns
(except for the virtual asset), that is, xli(0) = x¯
L−l ∀i = 1, ..., N and ∀l =
1, 2, 3. For the sake of simplicity, we consider only a taxation scheme
in our simulations, that is, the Tobin-like tax (see Section 3.1.3.1). We
evaluate the onset of the herding phenomenon in the last 1000 iterations
(k∗ = 4000).
6.3 Main Results
Given these premises, we can now go through our numerical results. We
start by noting that, although the dynamics of xi(k) in Eq. (6-5) do not
fulfill the assumptions made in [37], we observe that |C(p)| = |Co(p)| ∀p.
As the opinion of all agents in the set Co(p) converges to that of the
pinner, i.e. xi(k) = x¯ ∀i ∈ Co(p), and ∀k = T − 1000, . . . , T , we also
have that si(k) = s¯ ∀i ∈ Co(p) and ∀k = 1, . . . , T . In other words, all
agents achieving consensus on the state of the pinner also imitate the
latter’s trading strategy. Hence, the set C(p) represents a prediction of
the set H(p) of agents who herd in the p-th simulation. As, when p = 0,
that is, in the no-herding case, xli(k) = x¯
L−l ∀l = 1, 2, 3, and ∀i, k, we
have that b = 0, and thus Eq. (6-7) becomes
LSV (p) =
|H(p)|
N
. (6-8)
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Figure 6-1: Intensity of the predicted (red bars) and observed
(blue bars) informational cascade for each value of p.
This allows to predict the herding intensity as
L̂SV (p) =
|C(p)|
N
. (6-9)
As shown in Fig. 6-1, we find that LSV (p) ≥ L̂SV (p) ∀p, as we observe
that the set of herding agents is often larger than the set C(p), that is,
C(p) ⊆ H(p).
By inspecting the opinion dynamics of the agents in the simulations for
which LSV (p) > L̂SV (p), we notice that the agents in the set H(p) −
C(p) perform the correct ranking of the assets although they do not reach
consensus on the state of the pinner, i.e., ∀i ∈ H(p)− C(p), we have{
xi(k) 6= x¯(k);
x1i (k) > x
2
i (k) > x
3
i (k) ∀k = T − 1000, . . . , T,
(6-10)
yielding si(k) = s¯ ∀i ∈ H(p)−C(p). This because, as shown in Fig. 6-2,
the expected returns perceived by the agents in the set H(p)− C(p) are
close enough to those of the pinner to determine the same output, that is,
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the same trading strategy. These influencees, being in the downstream of
several influencers but also of some non informed leaders, feel the opinion
of the latter as a disturbance on their opinion, thus compromising their
ability of converging to the correct expectations.
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Figure 6-2: Expected returns of the asset 1 (blue lines), 2 (red
lines), and 3 (green lines) perceived by the agents included in the
set C(p) (Fig. 6.4(a)), H(p) − C(p) (Fig. 6.4(b)), and V − H(p)
(Fig. 6.4(c)), respectively, for the simulation p = 31.
6.4 Further Results
In the following, we will show some further results, in order to highlight
the robustness of the proposed model to variations of initial conditions,
and of the selected topology of interaction.
6.4.1 Initial Conditions
In our simulations, we have intentionally maximized the distortion of the
initial perception of the expected returns of the agents to better highlight
the emergence of herding behavior. Namely, we show how the agents
involved in the informational cascade drastically change their opinion
even though their initial opinions are opposite to those of the pinner.
However, a random selection of the initial opinions does not qualitatively
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affect our results. Even in this case, indeed, we observe that the set C(p)
represents a prediction of the minimum number of agents that actually
herd. Namely, we have that |C(p)| = |Co(p)|, and that C(p) ⊆ H(p) ∀p,
as shown in Fig. 6-3. In the view of this, we can assess that our model
is independent from the initial conditions, thus overcoming one of the
limits of the classical models of informational cascades (see Section 4.2).
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Figure 6-3: Intensity of the predicted (red bars) and observed
(blue bars) informational cascade for each value of p, and for a
random selection of the agents’ initial opinions.
6.4.2 Topologies of Interaction
As already pointed out, in our simulations we selected a real sufficiently
large network. Actually, we performed numerical simulations with dif-
ferent networks of interaction, obtaining the same qualitative results. In-
deed, for each scenario of interaction, we have that |C(p)| = |Co(p)| ∀p,
while in Fig. 6-4 we can observe the triggered partial informational
cascades for three of these scenarios.
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These further results share the robustness of our model to variations of
initial conditions, and network interactions, thus highlighting the flexi-
bility of our model to be adapted to different contexts.
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Figure 6-4: Intensity of the predicted (red bars) and observed
(blue bars) informational cascade for each value of p, and for
three different networks of interaction.
CHAPTER 7
Phase Transitions in Partial
Pinning Control of
Complex Networks: the
Generating Functions’
Approach
7.1 About Phase Transitions
The term phase transition (or phase change) is most commonly used to
describe transitions between solid, liquid and gaseous states of matter,
and, in rare cases, plasma (physics). A phase of a thermodynamic sys-
tem and the states of matter have uniform physical properties. During
a phase transition certain properties of the system change, often dis-
continuously, as a result of the change of some external condition, such
as temperature, pressure, or others. For example, a liquid may become
gas upon heating to the boiling point, resulting in an abrupt change
in volume. The measurement of the external conditions at which the
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transformation occurs is termed phase transition. Phase transitions are
common in nature and used today in many technologies.
The condition for phase transitions generally stems from the interac-
tions of a large number of particles in a system, and does not appear in
systems that are too small. Phase transitions can occur and are defined
for non-thermodynamic systems, where temperature is not a parameter.
Examples include: quantum phase transitions, dynamic phase transi-
tions, and topological (structural) phase transitions. In these types of
systems other parameters take the place of temperature. For instance,
connection probability replaces temperature for percolating networks.
Paul Ehrenfest [67] classified phase transitions based on the behavior of
the thermodynamic free energy E as a function of other thermodynamic
variables, such as temperature T . Under this scheme, phase transitions
were labeled by the lowest derivative of the free energy that is discon-
tinuous at the transition. The transitions are classified as
 first-order phase transitions, which exhibit a discontinuity in the
first derivative of the free energy with respect to some thermo-
dynamic variables. First-order phase transitions are those that
involve a latent heat. During such a transition, a system either
absorbs or releases a fixed (and typically large) amount of energy
per volume. During this process, the temperature of the system
will stay constant as heat is added.
 second-order phase transitions, which are continuous in the first
derivative (the order parameter, which is the first derivative of the
free energy with respect to the external field, is continuous across
the transition), but exhibit discontinuity in a second derivative of
the free energy.
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Figure 7-1: An example of first order phase transition.
Figure 7-2: An example of second order phase transition.
7.1.1 Phase Transitions in Partial Pinning Control
Pinning control in complex networks is a synchronization technique
around a desired trajectory s(k). Applying partial pinning control on a
given network, we actually observe a transition from a fully incoherent
behavior to the synchronization of the whole network. This phenomenon
may be associated to a phase transition, in which the coherence param-
eter is represented by the fraction of pinning controllable nodes.
Namely, let’s give a deeper look to Fig. 6-1, focusing our attention
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Figure 7-3: Fraction of pinning controllable nodes for each
value of p.
on the intensity of informational cascade predicted through the partial
pinning control algorithm, see Fig. 7-3. As we can see, by increasing
the number of appropriately selected pinned nodes, we can notice a first
order phase transition from a fully incoherent network behavior to the
synchronization of the whole network to the pinner’s trajectory.
Abstracting from the application proposed in the previous chapter, Fig.
7-3 represents an analysis of partial pinning controllability of the se-
lected network. Namely, the analysis of the structural conditions for
partial pinning controllability of a generic network provides lots of in-
formation on the network itself, such as the minimum number of pinned
nodes required in order to control the whole network, how many nodes
can be controlled with a limited amount of resources, represented by the
pinned nodes, and how much effort must be done in order to control
almost the whole network.
By inspecting Fig. 7-3 we have realized that the emergence of a first
order phase transition depends on the existence of a Giant Strongly
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Figure 7-4: Partial pinning controllability of a network of 2400
nodes which does not include a GSCC. Notice the emergence of
a second order phase transition.
Connected Component (GSCC, see Section 2.1.3.1) in the network. The
GSCC behaves like latent heat and represents the number of nodes to
be pinning controlled to get the phase transition and p∗ is the minimum
number of Root Strongly Connected Components (RSCC, see Section
2.1.3.1) to be pinned to pinning control the GSCC. Actually, networks
without a GSCC exhibit a second order phase transition. An example
is given in Fig. 7-4. Thus, the type of the emerging phase transition in
partial pinning controllability of a complex network is strictly related to
the topological features of the latter, most of them are well explained
by the degree distribution of the network itself.
In the view of this, a question naturally arise. Are we able to analytically
predict the partial pinning controllability of a given network, without
leveraging the numerical simulations? In particular, some issues could
be addressed, such as:
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Questions 7.1.1.
1) Starting by the only knowledge of the degree distribution of a given
network, can we analytically predict which kind of phase transition
will arise?
2) As to the first order phase transition, can we estimate the width
of the discontinuity, in order to predict the number of controllable
nodes in correspondence of the transition?
3) Can we predict the minimum number of nodes which should be
pinned in order to observe the jump?
To answer this questions, a statistical mechanics approach could be con-
sidered. In particular, we will try to leverage the generating functions to
better characterize the phenomenon of phase transition in partial pin-
ning controllability of complex networks. The details of this approach
are extensively explained in the following.
7.2 Statistical Mechanics of Complex Networks
The study of network models began with Erdo˝s and Re´nyi [45, 46, 47].
They proposed a model of networks with randomly distributed links.
The random graph of Erdo˝s and Re´nyi is one of the most studied models
of a network, and possesses the considerable advantage of being exactly
solvable for many of its average properties. However, due to the devel-
opment of computers, allowing the analysis of large amounts of data,
such as the Internet and WWW, some analysis of real world networks
has been done in the last decade. In particular, other models of com-
plex networks were proposed in order to capture some features of real
networks, such as the well known scale-free and small-world networks.
Although these models are more appropriate than the random network
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to represent some real networks, they still differs from real-world topolo-
gies in some fundamental ways, as pointed out in [116, 3].
In the view of this, recent works on the structure of complex networks
have focused attention on graphs with arbitrary degree distributions.
Studying the properties of random graphs defined by their degree dis-
tribution is not simply an abstract problem; it has a clear practical
motivation. For instance, one may consider an empirical degree distri-
bution that is based on measured or observed data, and try to extract
information on the network itself which do not follow a specific degree
distribution.
Clearly, a degree distribution does not define a graph uniquely. That
said, an attractive alternative to the classical models is to define a ran-
dom graph by a given degree distribution assuming that apart from the
degree distribution the graph is absolutely random. This line of research
was introduced by Molloy and Reed [91] and was later developed further
by Newman, Strogatz, and Watts, see [96, 95], whose main results are
summarized in the following.
7.2.1 Generating Functions of Undirected Networks
Newman, Strogatz, and Watts developed a formalism for calculating a
variety of quantities, both local and global, on large graphs with ar-
bitrary probability distribution of the degrees of their vertices, in the
termodynamic field. In all respects other than their degree distribution,
these graphs are assumed to be entirely random. This means that the
degrees of all vertices are independent identically distributed random
integers drawn from a specified distribution. For a given choice of these
degrees, also called the “degree sequence”, the graph is chosen uniformly
at random from the set of all graphs with that degree sequence.
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Their approach is based on the generating functions [130], the most
fundamental of which is the generating functionG0(x) for the probability
distribution of vertex degrees k, which is defined as
G0(x) =
∞∑
k=0
pkx
k, (7-1)
where pk is the probability that a randomly chosen vertex has degree k,
and |x| ≤ 1. As pk is assumed to be correctly normalized, we have that
G0(1) = 1. (7-2)
The probability distribution pk is given by the k
th derivative of G0(x):
pk =
1
k!
dkG0
dxk
∣∣∣∣
x=0
. (7-3)
Thus, the function G0(x) generates the probability distribution pk.
Consequently, the average degree z of a network is given by
z = 〈k〉 =
∑
k
kpk = G
′
0(1), (7-4)
while higher moments of the distribution can be computed from higher
derivatives:
〈kn〉 =
∑
k
knpk =
[(
x
d
dx
)n
G0(x)
]
x=1
. (7-5)
An important property of the generating functions is the so called “pow-
ers property:” if we choose m vertices at random from a large graph, then
the distribution of the sum of the degrees of those vertices is generated
by [G0(x)]
m.
Another quantity of interest is the generating function of the distribution
of the degree of the vertices that we arrive at by following a randomly
chosen vertex:
G1(x) =
G′0(x)
G′0(1)
=
1
z
G′0(x). (7-6)
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Eq. (7-6) and the powers property allows to define the probability dis-
tribution of the second neighbors of a vertex as∑
k
pk[G1(x)]
k = G0
(
G1(x)
)
. (7-7)
Consequently, the average number z2 of second neighbors is
z2 =
[
d
dx
G0
(
G1(x)
)]
x=1
= G′0(1)G
′
1(1) = G
′′
0(1). (7-8)
Now, let us consider the distribution of the sizes of connected com-
ponents in the graph. Let H1(x) be the generating function for the
distribution of the sizes of components which are reached by choosing a
random edge and following it to one of its ends. It can be written as
H1(x) = xG1
(
H1(x)
)
. (7-9)
If we start at a randomly chosen vertex, then we have one such compo-
nent at the end of each edge leaving that vertex, and hence the gener-
ating function for the size of the whole component is
H0(x) = xG0
(
H1(x)
)
. (7-10)
In principle, therefore, given the functions G0(x) and G1(x), we can
solve Eq. (7-9) for H1(x) and substitute into Eq. (7-10) to get H0(x).
Then we can find the probability that a randomly chosen vertex belongs
to a component of size s by taking the s-th derivative of H0. In practice,
unfortunately, this is usually impossible. However, we can find closed-
form expressions for the average properties of clusters. For example,
the average size of the component to which a randomly chosen vertex
belongs, for the case where there is no giant component in the graph,
after some manipulations, is given by
〈s〉 = 1 + G
′
0(1)
1−G′1(1) = 1 +
z21
z1 − z2 , (7-11)
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where z1 = z is the average number of first neighbors. We see that this
expression diverges when G′1(1) = 1. This point marks the point at
which a giant component first appears. Namely, from Eq. (7-11) we can
derive the condition for the existence of a Giant Connected Component
for undirected graphs as ∑
k
k(k − 2)pk > 0. (7-12)
This result has been derived for the first time by Molloy and Reed in
[91].
By definition, H0(x) generates the probability distribution of the sizes
of components excluding the giant component. This means that H0(1)
is no longer unity, as it is for the other generating functions considered
so far, but instead takes the value 1− S, where S is the fraction of the
graph occupied by the giant component. We can use this to calculate
the size of the giant component from Eqs. (7-10) and (7-9) as
S = 1−G0(H1(1)). (7-13)
Thus, by leveraging these functions, we can derive lots of information
starting by the only knowledge of the degree distribution. These rela-
tions have been exactly derived, for instance, for undirected random and
scale-free networks, which exhibit a Poisson and a power-law distribu-
tion, respectively. For further details, see [96].
7.2.2 Generating Functions of Directed Networks
Some results regarding the generating functions have also been proposed
for directed networks. In the following, we summarize the ones of our in-
terest, taken from [96, 42]. The results are obtained for graphs with sta-
tistically uncorrelated vertices and an arbitrary joint in and out-degree
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distribution p(ki, ko), where ki and ko correspond to the in- and out-
degree, respectively, and thus k = ki + ko is the number of total connec-
tion of a node. In the view of this, the generating function of a directed
network is
Φ(x, y) =
∑
ki,ko
p(ki, ko)x
kiyko , (7-14)
with |x| and |y| ≤ 1. When the links are all inside the network, the
average number of in- and out- degree is the same, thus being
∂xΦ(x, 1)
∣∣
x=1
= ∂yΦ(1, y)
∣∣
y=1
≡ z(d). (7-15)
Therefore, the average degree is z = 2z(d).
If one ignores the directedness of edges, then the generating function
becomes
Φ(w) = Φ(x, x), (7-16)
and
Φ
(w)
1 (x) =
Φ′(w)(x)
z
. (7-17)
The criterion of Molloy and Reed for undirected networks (see Eq.
(7-12)) can be used to check the existence in a digraph of a Giant Weakly
Connected Component (GWCC, see Section 2.1.3.1), while the size of
the GWCC can be computed as
W = 1− Φ(w)(tc), tc = Φ(w)1 (tc). (7-18)
In a directed network, we can also analyze the giant in- and out- com-
ponent, GIN and GOUT, respectively (see Section 2.1.3.1 for their def-
inition). Let us define the generating function of the out (in)-degree
distribution of the vertex, approachable by following a randomly chosen
edge moving along (against) the edge direction as
Φ
(o)
1 (y) =
1
z(d)
∂xΦ(x, y)
∣∣∣
x=1
; Φ
(i)
1 (x) =
1
z(d)
∂yΦ(x, y)
∣∣∣
y=1
, (7-19)
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respectively.
In the view of this, the existence of the GIN and GOUT, and conse-
quently of the GSCC, is ensured by
Φ
′(i)
1 (1) = Φ
′(o)
1 (1) =
1
z(d)
∂2xyΦ(x, y)
∣∣∣
x=1,y=1
> 1, (7-20)
that is ∑
ki,ko
(2kiko − ki − ko)p(ki, ko) > 0, (7-21)
which corresponds to the criterion of Mollow and Reed for digraphs.
If Eq. (7-21) holds, then there are nontrivial solutions for the equations
xc = Φ
(i)
1 (xc) yc = Φ
(o)
1 (yc). (7-22)
xc < 1 and yc < 1 are the probabilities that the connected component
reached by moving against (along) the edge directions, starting from a
randomly chosen vertex, are finite. The in- and out- components of a
vertex are sets of vertices approachable from this vertex moving against
and along its edges, respectively, plus the vertex itself. Notice that any
vertex that has only a finite out-component cannot, by definition, belong
to the GIN.
Then, p(ki, ko)x
ki
c and p(ki, ko)y
ko
c are the probabilities that a random
chosen edge with ki incoming and ko outcoming edge have finite in- and
out- components. Summation of these expressions over (ki, ko) yields
the total probability that the in- and out- components of a randomly
chosen vertex are finite, that is, Φ(xc, 1) and Φ(1, yc), respectively.
From these considerations, we can derive the size of GIN and GOUT as
I = 1− Φ(xc, 1), O = 1− Φ(1, yc), (7-23)
respectively.
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Notice that a vertex belongs to the GSCC if its in- and out- components
are both infinite. Thus, the size of the GSCC in a digraph is
S = 1− Φ(xc, 1)− Φ(1, yc)− Φ(xc, yc), (7-24)
where Φ(xc, yc) is the probability that both the in- and out- component
of a vertex are finite. Eq. (7-24) can be explained in the following way.
If at least one of a vertex’s outgoing edges leads to anywhere in the GIN,
then one can reach the GSCC from that vertex. Conversely, if at least
one of a vertex’s incoming edges leads from anywhere in the GOUT,
then the vertex can be reached from the GSCC. If and only if both of
these conditions are satisfied simultaneously, then the vertex belongs to
the GSCC itself.
As for undirected networks, some results have been proposed for di-
graphs with well known degree distributions, see [92] for more details.
7.3 Generating Functions and Phase Transi-
tions: Answered and Open Questions
The generating functions are actually not easy to manage. Moreover,
they are based on some hypothesis that in general are difficult to satisfy.
However, this approach presents different benefits, as it allows to de-
scribe lots of properties of a given network. Perhaps the real advantage
of this approach is that is allows to deal with specific real-world graphs
which have known degree distributions, known because we can measure
them directly. For these graphs, one can measure the exact numbers
nk of vertices having degree k, and hence write down the exact gener-
ating function for that probability distribution in the form of a finite
polynomial:
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G0(x) =
∑
k nkx
k∑
k nk
, (7-25)
where the sum in the denominator ensures that the generating function
is properly normalized. Starting from Eq. (7-25), one can derives lots
of information on a network which does not follow a specific degree
distribution, as happens in almost all the real networks. The same, as
obvious, could be done for a directed network.
For our purpose, this approach allows to give an answer to some of Ques-
tions (7.1.1). In particular, they may be reformulated in the following
way:
Questions 7.3.1.
1) Does a condition of the existence of the GSCC exist? If so, is it
satisfied?
2) Are we able to compute the expected value of the size of the GSCC,
stated its existence?
3) Can we predict the number of roots which enters the GSCC?
Question 1) is easily to answer thanks to the aforementioned results.
Namely, a condition for the existence of the GSCC actually exists for
both undirected and directed networks. It corresponds to the criterion of
Molloy and Reed in Eqs. (7-12) and (7-21). By checking this condition
for a given network, one can predict which kind of phase transition
will arise when a partial pinning control is applied, starting from the
only knowledge of the degree distribution. Namely, if the condition
is satisfied, we will observe a first order phase transition; otherwise, a
second order phase transition will arises.
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As to question 2), we have seen that, when a giant component is present,
it is possible to estimate its size, see Eqs. (7-13) and (7-24). In this way,
we can predict the number of nodes which could be pinning controlled
if we would be able to pinning control the giant component.
Question 3) is perhaps the most interesting, but also the most difficult
to answer. Namely, if we were able to predict the minimum number of
nodes that must be pinned in order to pinning control the giant com-
ponent, we could also evaluate a priori the convenience of such effort,
in order to decide whether it’s worth to spend resources for a particu-
lar aim. Actually, in order to predict p∗, one could predict the number
of roots which enters the GSCC. Thus, we should have information on
the nature of the nodes belonging to GIN. Unfortunately, although the
generating functions’ approach provides information on the size of the
GIN (see Eq. (7-23)), up to now nothing more we can say about its
composition.
Of course, this issue could be addressed in a future research. A possible
way to answer this question could be to compute the probability that a
node belongs to the GIN, given that its in-degree is equal to zero. In
this way, we could have an estimate of the roots included in the GIN.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusions
This thesis has been mostly motivated by the words of Jean-Claude
Trichet, the former European Central Bank Governor, who, speaking
about the recent financial crisis, highlighted the incapability of neoclas-
sical economics of analyzing and predicting this sudden event. Thus,
he encouraged the scientific community from other disciplines to pro-
vide tools that might complement traditional economics. In the view
of this, we have tried to give our little contribution by exploiting our
background in the field of control theory. Our interest focused on the
phenomenon of informational cascades, which have been used as possi-
ble explanations for financial bubbles and crashes. However, we noticed
that the classical models of informational cascades proposed in the lit-
erature are based on some restrictive assumptions which turned out to
be unrealistic. For instance, they only consider the case of a total cas-
cade, which is disconfirmed by empirical evidence. In the view of this,
we tried to exploit tools from control theory to overcome some of these
limitations. Namely, we proposed a novel model of opinion dynamics ca-
pable of triggering informational cascades of different intensities. This
model allowed us to treat informational cascades as a pinning control
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problem, and thus to leverage tools from partial pinning control to pre-
dict the emergence of such phenomena. We tested our opinion dynamic
model in an agent-based model of artificial market, that we built for this
purpose. We numerically showed how our model is capable of triggering
informational cascades of different intensities. Moreover, we showed how
these results confirmed the predictions made by leveraging tools from
partial pinning control theory.
Eventually, we proposed a different approach which could allow to ana-
lytically characterize the partial pinning corollability of a given network
with arbitrary degree distribution. Indeed, by inspecting the partial
pinning controllability of the networks we have analyzed, we have found
a close correlation with the topological features of the latter. In par-
ticular, the presence of a giant strongly connected component strongly
affects the pinning controllability of the network. To better understand
this correlation, we have tried to leverage tools from the generating func-
tions’ approach, which provides lots of information about the topological
features of a network with given degree distribution, and thus could also
allow to analytically predict information on the partial pinning control-
lability of complex networks. Indeed, thanks to this approach, we have
already provided an answer on some issues on the topic. However, some
criticisms are still unanswered, such as quantifying and predicting the
effort that should be spent in order to pinning control most of a network,
in order to evaluate the convenience of such effort. Given the novelty of
the topic, it will be undoubtedly deeper investigated in the future.
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